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Summary
Many countries are in the process of reforming their electricity industries or are
considering such reforms since the 1980s. The introduction of the electricity market
is the most important part of this reform. This electricity market is considered as
a deregulated electricity market compared to the regulated electricity prices. The
deregulated electricity market is expected to be stable and competitive. However,
price volatility and market power may exist in the deregulated electricity markets.
To address these stabilization and competition issues, vesting contracts and forward
contracts, which are both bilateral contracts, are introduced.
This thesis consists of four parts. The first part of the thesis is a literature
review of market mechanism, bilateral contracts, price volatility, market power
and oligopoly models.
The second part of the thesis describes how the vesting contracts work on con-
trolling price volatility in the deregulated electricity market. The vesting contract
is a kind of bilateral contract. A bilateral contract is an agreement on dispatching
an amount of electricity (contract quantity) at a fixed price (contract price) during
a certain time interval. Note that vesting contracts are imposed and not negotiated.
The two basic elements of vesting contracts are hedge quantity and hedge price,
which are similar to contract quantity and contract price of bilateral contracts. In
the deregulated electricity market, the equilibrium price where supply and demand
matches is called market clearing price (MCP) and the matched quantity is called
market clearing quantity (MCQ). The customer price (CP) is a combination of
hedge price and MCP weighted by their trading quantities. To study the impact of
vesting contracts, we build mathematical models and analyze how the hedge price
and hedge quantity affect the uncertainties of MCP and CP. Variances are used to
characterize the uncertainties of MCP and CP. We assume that a generation com-
pany (genco) bids according to its Marginal Cost (MC) without considering vesting
vi
contracts and supply function is uncertain in the mathematical models. We find
that the variance of MCP increases when hedge quantity is assigned. However, the
variance of CP decreases when hedge quantity is assigned. Also, a numerical study
is conducted using the data of the Singapore electricity market from 2003 to 2010
to verify our models.
In the third part, supply function equilibria (SFE) and Cournot models are used
to investigate the impact of bilateral contracts on the variances of MCP and CP.
We assume that gencos bid strategically to maximize their profits while considering
bilateral contracts and demand function is uncertain in this part. We find out that
the variances of MCP and CP are decreasing functions of contract quantity in
a competitive market by using the SFE model. Even when the market is not
competitive, bilateral contracts can also reduce the variances of MCP and CP by
setting contract quantity within a reasonable range in the SFE model. These two
results, which hold in the SFE model, also hold in the Cournot model. Moreover,
a numerical study is conducted to verify our models.
In the fourth part, we investigate the impact of bilateral contracts on the spot
market by using the Cournot model. The MCQ, spot market quantity (SMQ),
MCP, CP, profit of the market and market power in the spot market are examined
closely. The SMQ is any amount of trading electricity other than contract quantity.
We find three features in this part.
Firstly, we assume that demand function is changed with the introduction of
bilateral contracts in our models. The analytical results show that our models are
identical to those models with unchanged demand functions. This finding provides
good justification of the assumption that demand function is unchanged with the
introduction of bilateral contracts.
Secondly, we find some properties for the MCQ, SMQ, MCP, CP and profit of
the market. When the bilateral contracts are introduced, MCQ may be increased
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and MCP may be decreased. We show that the MCQ is an increasing function
of contract quantity. Also, the MCP and the SMQ are decreasing functions of
contract quantity. We also show that MCQ with contracts is an upper bound of
MCQ without contracts, and MCQ without contracts is an upper bound of SMQ.
Moreover, we show that the MCP is reduced in the spot market with contracts. The
variances of MCP are identical with and without bilateral contracts. However, the
variance of CP is reduced with contracts. In addition, we find that the allocation
of total contract quantity may not affect the MCQ, SMQ and MCP; that is, the
allocation of fixed total contract quantity has no relationship with the MCQ, SMQ
and MCP. Besides, we find several properties for the profit of the market. We
derive the closed forms for total profit of the market with and without contracts.
We also show that the total profit of the market is reduced by the introduction of
bilateral contracts if contract price is less than MC.
Thirdly, the impact of bilateral contracts on the market power is investigated.
We first use a conventional index, Lerner Index, to test the market power. This
Lerner Index shows that market power is reduced by the introduction of bilateral
contracts. We then propose another index which is defined as the ratio of profits
with and without competition. We call this index as the Profit Index. By using this
Profit Index, we find that market power is an increasing function of contract price
subject to a given contract quantity. A numerical study is conducted using the
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Most electricity industries were vertically integrated and geographically monopo-
lized before the 1980s (Joskow, 2008). However, these monopolies may be ineffi-
cient. Joskow (1998) pointed out the disadvantages, such as high operating costs,
high prices and lack of new investment that existed in such a system. Thus, many
countries are in the process of reforming their electricity industries or are consid-
ering the reforms, such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, California (USA), Chile,
New Zealand, Singapore, the Nordic countries and United Kingdom (Chang, 2007;
Joskow, 2008). The main idea of the reforms is to introduce some market mech-
anism. With market mechanism, market clearing price (MCP) is determined by
supply and demand. This kind of market is called the wholesale market. In this
chapter, some background information about deregulated electricity markets is pro-
vided, followed by the motivation behind this research. We then present the scope
of our study, and the contributions of our work. Finally, the thesis structure is
provided.
1.1 Background
The electricity industries have been reformed since the 1980s in many countries,
such as Chile, United Kingdom, California and Singapore (Joskow, 2008). Chile
began its reform in 1982 (Arellano, 2008), which was the earliest electricity industry
reform (Joskow, 2008). However, it did not consider market mechanism in the
reform. Chile rearranged the capacity of each generating unit in an ascending
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production cost order. These reordered production costs can be considered as a
supply function. Then, the electricity price was decided by this supply function
and demand. The reform of Chile was incomplete as the electricity price was
based on the production costs (Arellano, 2008). There were no offers submitted by
generation companies (gencos).
Another example of reform is that of United Kingdom in 1988 (Joskow, 2008).
The core of electricity reform in United Kingdom is the wholesale market. From
April 1st, 1990 to March 26th, 2001, an electricity pool was set up and operated
as the wholesale market. In each time period, gencos submitted their offers to
the pool. Then, electricity was dispatched according to the offers and the actual
demand in the pool. Payments to gencos were based on the price of marginal
offer, which is the highest accepted offer (von der Fehr and Harbord, 1993). From
March 27th, 2001, the electricity pool was replaced by the New Electricity Trading
Arrangement (NETA). The NETA involves not only offers from gencos but also
bids from customers. Moreover, each accepted offer is traded at its offer price
instead of a uniform price (Green, 2003).
California started reforming its electricity industry in the middle of the 1990s
(Green, 2003). The retailers in California were asked to supply electricity at fixed
prices. However, retailers were also asked to purchase electricity from the wholesale
market. If MCP is low, then this system works. Otherwise, retailers lose consid-
erable amount of money (Kee, 2001). The California electricity crisis in 2000 and
2001 demonstrates that this type of system may be risky. Electricity MCP may be
highly unstable in such a system.
Singapore began its electricity reform in 1995 (Energy Market Authority (EMA)
Singapore, 2010b). The reform involves privatization of state-owned monopolies,
reformation of regulations and reformation of the electricity market. A market
was built and named as the New Electricity Market of Singapore in 2003. This
market consists of two submarkets: a wholesale market and a retail market. The
2
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wholesale market also comprises of the procurement market and real-time market.
The procurement market is for securing operation of the power system. In the
real-time market, customers and gencos trade through Energy Market Company
(Energy Market Authority (EMA) Singapore, 2008). This thesis studies the real-
time part of the wholesale market. It is also called the electricity spot market. In
the retail market, retailers buy electricity from the wholesale market and sell to
consumers (Energy Market Authority (EMA) Singapore, 2010a).
The market mechanism of Singapore electricity spot market is similar to that of
the pool in United Kingdom. For each half an hour, MCP is determined by offers
of gencos, demands of customers and other system constraints. An offer includes
two parts: quantity and price. They represent the electricity quantity a genco is
willing to supply at that given price. By cumulating the quantities below a fixed
price, the offers can be transferred into a supply function. The MCP is decided at
the point where supply function intersects demand function.
1.2 Motivation
The core of the reformed electricity industries is the construction of electricity mar-
kets. These electricity markets are considered as deregulated electricity markets
compared to the regulated electricity prices. The deregulated electricity markets
are expected to be stable and competitive. However, the MCP may be unstable
in the markets. For example, the California electricity crisis in 2000 and 2001 is
caused by unstable electricity MCP. Usually, there are three reasons for unstable
electricity MCP: unstable supply, unstable demand and high storage cost. The
first reason is unstable supply. Unstable fuel oil prices and unforeseeable break-
down of generating units are the two causes of unstable supply. Sueyoshi and
Tadiparthi (2008) attributed the California electricity crisis in 2000 and 2001 to
the rising marginal production costs of crude oil and natural gas. In Singapore,
97% of generating units rely on fuel oil and natural gas to generate electricity (Mar-
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ket Surveillance and Compliance Panel (MSCP) Singapore, 2007). Since fuel cost
takes a large proportion in electricity production, the prices of fuel oil and natu-
ral gas have significant influence on electricity MCP. Unforeseeable breakdown of
generating units also contributes to unstable supply. Generating units may break
down any time. Hence, gencos may not be able to supply the quantity they offer
to sell in the wholesale market.
The second reason is unstable demand. The inelasticity and fluctuation are the
two attributes of demand (Stoft, 2002). Demand is considered to be inelastic due
to its lack of response to high price within a short time. Fluctuation of demand is
caused by weather, temperature, unpredictable activities and other factors.
The third reason is that electricity storage cost is high, or that electricity storage
may not be economically feasible. One common method for electricity storage is
the pumped-storage hydroelectricity. However, the construction cost is extremely
high and sometimes the method is infeasible due to the geographic environment,
such as in Singapore. Thus, limited electricity storage may not be used to smooth
the gap between supply and demand (Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002). As a
result, the MCP, which is mainly based on supply and demand, will become highly
unstable if the gap between supply and demand cannot be smoothed (Anderson
and Davison, 2008).
Apart from the stabilization, another issue of the deregulated electricity markets
is the competitiveness of the markets. In a perfect competitive market, gencos bid
according to their marginal costs. However, in a monopoly market or an oligopoly
market, gencos adopt bidding strategies to maximize their own profits. This ability
of a genco to use bidding strategies is called market power (Wolak, 2000). The genco
with market power is usually called price maker (De La Torre, 2002). Generally,
price makers can have influence on the electricity prices and earn more profits.
The deregulated electricity markets are expected to be competitive due to two
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reasons. The first reason is that competition encourages gencos to control operat-
ing costs and improve technologies in the spot markets. Secondly, the benefit of
competition from the deregulated electricity markets can be shared by consumers
(Joskow, 2008). However, market power does exist in some electricity markets. For
example, Woo et al. (2003) examined the market power in electricity markets in
the United Kingdom, Norway, Alberta and California. They found that market
power existed in all these four markets. Mount (2001) showed that the gencos with
market power can increase electricity prices. In this case, consumers suffer from
high electricity prices.
In order to control the volatility of MCP and mitigate the market power, vesting
and forward contracts are introduced. These two types of bilateral contracts work
similarly in the deregulated electricity markets. The difference is that the forward
contracts are negotiated and the vesting contracts are not. A bilateral contract
is an agreement on dispatching an amount of electricity (contract quantity) at a
fixed price (contract price) during a certain time interval. The contract price and
quantity are the two basic elements of these contracts.
To sum up, stabilization and competition are the two important issues in the
deregulated electricity markets. We are interested in exploring the impact of bi-
lateral contracts on these two issues in this thesis. We hope the theoretical and
empirical results of this thesis can benefit the deregulation process around the world
to some extent.
1.3 Scope of study
In microeconomics, MCP is the equilibrium price decided by supply and demand.
All the electricity traded is called market clearing quantity (MCQ). Other than
the contract quantity, the balance trading quantity is called spot market quantity
(SMQ). Bilateral contracts enforce the market to trade the contract quantity at
contract price first. Other than the contract quantity, the remaining quantity is
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still traded at MCP, that is, SMQ is traded at MCP. As a result, a part of supply
and demand has been satisfied by bilateral contracts. With contracts, participants
face two trading prices: contract price and MCP. The combination of contract
price and MCP (according to trading quantities) is called customer price (CP). We
consider an unstable environment where supply and demand are unstable. Thus,
MCP and CP are unstable. In the thesis, we study the uncertainties of MCP and
CP with and without contracts. Variance is used to measure the uncertainty.
The main purpose of this thesis is to develop mathematical models to examine
the stabilization and competition issues in the electricity markets. The specific
objective of this research is to investigate the impact of bilateral contracts on the
price volatility and market power.
To investigate the impact of bilateral contracts on the price volatility, we first
develop analytical models to study the impact of vesting contracts on the variances
of MCP and CP. In these analytical models, a genco supplies electricity according
to its marginal cost without considering vesting contracts. In this case, the genco
may lose or earn money from the vesting contracts. If the hedge price of vesting
contract is higher than MCP, the genco earns money from the vesting contracts.
Otherwise, it will lose money. Whether the genco is losing or earning money from
the vesting contracts, the uncertainty of supplying the hedge quantity is shifted
to the trading quantity other than the hedge quantity. As a result, the variance
of MCP is increased. The crucial question is how the vesting contracts affect the
variance of CP. We investigate this question closely in this thesis.
We then present two oligopoly models, supply function equilibria (SFE) and
Cournot models, to investigate the impact of bilateral contracts on the variances of
MCP and CP. In the SFE and Cournot models, gencos bid strategically by taking
into consideration the production cost, demand and bilateral contracts. The goal of
each genco is to maximize its own profit. The difference between oligopoly models
and analytical models mentioned above is that the gencos bid strategically in the
6
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oligopoly models, while gencos bid according to marginal costs in the analytical
models.
Furthermore, Cournot models are also used to examine the impact of bilateral
contracts on the elements other than variances of MCP and CP in the deregulated
electricity markets. These elements include the MCQ, SMQ and profit of the
market.
To investigate the impact of bilateral contracts on market power, we propose
an index using the data of profits to measure market power. That is because most
existing indexes use only the data of market shares or market prices to measure
market power. Although profit is directly used to measure market power, we are
interested in studying the relative increase in profit to measure market power.
In this thesis, we consider an unstable environment where supply and demand
are unstable. Variance is used to measure the uncertainty. Other risk measurement
tools, such as Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR), are left
for future research. Furthermore, the models built are single-period models. Due
to time constraints, multi-period models will be considered in future studies.
1.4 Contributions
There are three main contributions in this thesis. Firstly, we develop analytical
models and analyze how the vesting contracts affect the uncertainties of MCP and
CP. We consider an unstable environment and assume that supply is a discrete
function. We find that the variance of MCP increases when hedge quantity is
assigned. This result is consistent with the results of Sapio and Wylomanska (2008).
However, the variance of CP decreases when hedge quantity is assigned. We also
find that the variances of MCP and CP do not have relationships with hedge price.
Moreover, we find that the variance of MCP is an increasing function of hedge
quantity. A numerical study is conducted using data from the Singapore electricity
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market from 2003 to 2010 to verify our model assumptions and the main results.
The data are also used to conduct parameter estimation.
Secondly, we present two models, SFE and Cournot, to investigate the impact of
bilateral contracts on the variances of MCP and CP. We find out that the variances
of MCP and CP are decreasing functions of contract quantity in a competitive
market for the SFE model. Even when the market is not competitive, bilateral
contracts can also reduce the variances of MCP and CP by setting contract quantity
in a reasonable range in the SFE model. These two results, which hold in the SFE
model, also hold in the Cournot model. Also, we show a numerical study based on
Singapore electricity market to support our models.
Thirdly, we use Cournot models to investigate the impact of bilateral contracts
on the spot market. Many researchers assume that demand function is not affected
by the introduction of bilateral contracts in Cournot models (Niu et al., 2005;
Bushnell 2007). However, we assume that demand function is affected by the
introduction of bilateral contracts in our Cournot models. We found that the
results of our models and the models of Niu et al. (2005) and Bushnell (2007) are
identical. This finding provides good justification for the assumption that demand
function is not affected by the introduction of bilateral contracts.
The MCQ, SMQ, MCP, CP, profit of the market and market power in the spot
market are examined closely by Cournot models. When the bilateral contracts
are introduced, MCQ may be increased and MCP may be decreased. We show
that the MCQ is an increasing function of contract quantity. Also, the MCP and
the SMQ are decreasing functions of contract quantity. We also show that MCQ
with contracts is an upper bound of MCQ without contracts, and MCQ without
contracts is an upper bound of SMQ. Moreover, we show that the MCP is reduced
in the spot market with contracts. The variances of MCP are identical with and
without bilateral contracts. However, the variance of CP is reduced with contracts.
In addition, we find that the allocation of total contract quantity may not affect
8
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MCQ, SMQ and MCP; that is, the allocation of fixed total contract quantity has
no relationship with MCQ, SMQ and MCP. Besides, we find several properties for
the profit of the market. We show the closed forms for total profit of the market
with and without contracts. We also show that total profit of the market is reduced
by the introduction of bilateral contracts if contract price is less than MC.
Lastly, the impact of bilateral contracts on the market power is investigated.
We first use a conventional index, Lerner Index, to test market power. This Lerner
Index shows that market power is reduced by the introduction of bilateral con-
tracts. This result is consistent with the results of Kelman (2001) and Chang
(2007). We then propose an index which is defined as the ratio of profit with and
without competition. We call this index as the Profit Index. By using this Profit
Index, market power is an increasing function of contract price for a given contract
quantity. Several numerical studies are conducted using the data of the Singapore
electricity market to verify our analytical results.
The results of this thesis have significant impact on using bilateral contracts to
ensure a stable and competitive market environment. Moreover, the models built
in this thesis are helpful for the market participants when they are signing bilateral
contracts. Specifically, both the theoretical and empirical results can benefit the
market participants in controlling their price uncertainties.
1.5 Organization of the thesis
This thesis focuses on two things. Firstly, we study the impact of bilateral contracts
on the price volatility. Secondly, we study the market power in the deregulated
electricity market. It consists of six chapters.
In Chapter 2, we present a literature review, which includes the market mecha-
nism, bilateral contracts, price volatility, market power and oligopoly models. We
first review these five areas separately. We also study the interaction of multiple
9
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areas.
In Chapter 3, we develop mathematical models and analyze how the vesting
contracts affect the uncertainties of MCP and CP. A numerical study is conducted
using data from the Singapore electricity market to verify our mathematical models.
The data are also used to conduct parameter estimation.
In Chapter 4, we present two oligopoly models, SFE and Cournot, to investi-
gate the impact of bilateral contracts on the variances of MCP and CP. We also
implement a numerical study based on the Singapore electricity market to verify
our models.
In Chapter 5, we study Cournot models and investigate the impact of bilateral
contracts on the spot market. The MCQ, SMQ, MCP, CP and profit of the market
in the spot market are examined closely. The impact of bilateral contracts on the
market power is also investigated. We first use a conventional index, Lerner Index,
to test the market power. Thereafter, we propose a new index called the Profit
Index to measure market power.
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. Directions for future research will also be
discussed. One possible future study is to consider different risk measurement tools,




The general structure of the electricity market is presented in some monographs
(Wood and Wollenberg, 1994; Bhattacharya, et al., 2001; Stoft, 2002). In this chap-
ter, we review the market mechanism, bilateral contracts, price volatility, market
power and oligopoly models.
2.1 Review of market mechanism
The introduction of the electricity spot market is the core of the electricity industry
reform, and electricity is traded in the electricity spot market. There are three
participants in the electricity spot market: suppliers, customers and an independent
system operator (ISO). Generally, the suppliers are gencos who sell electricity to
customers. Customers may represent real consumers or retailers. Retailers buy
electricity from the spot market and sell it to some real consumers. Usually, these
real consumers do not have the economical scale to buy electricity directly from
the spot market. Alternatively, it is not possible for them to buy electricity from
the spot market in the initial stage of the deregulation. In many countries, the
ISO collects information from both supply and demand sides, and then dispatches
electricity for each period in the spot market, such as in Singapore and United
Kingdom.
The trading periods may be different in different electricity spot markets. In
Australia, Singapore and United Kingdom, each period is half an hour (Woo et al.,
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2003; Anderson et al., 2007; Energy Market Authority (EMA) Singapore, 2010a).
However, each period is one hour in California, Norway and Spain (Woo et al.,
2003; Baillo et al., 2004).
In this section, we first review the electricity supply and demand. Then, we
present the trading procedures in the electricity spot market.
2.1.1 Supply
The electricity suppliers are gencos. The gencos bid to sell their electricity in the
electricity spot market. They submit a set of offers. Each offer specifies the price
at which the genco is willing to sell an amount of electricity.
Usually, the number of offers that each genco can submit is fixed in a specific
electricity spot market. For example, the number that each genco can submit is
10 in Australia and Singapore (Hu et al., 2005; Energy Market Authority (EMA)
Singapore, 2010a), 16 in California and only 3 in United Kingdom (Wang et al.,
2008). Some researchers work on how the number of offers affects the bidding
behaviors of gencos (Wang et al., 2008).
2.1.2 Demand
Usually, the demand side bidding is not available in the initial stage of the elec-
tricity spot markets. Demand is forecasted in each period as a single value in most
electricity spot markets, such as in Australia and Singapore (Hu et al., 2005; En-
ergy Market Authority (EMA) Singapore, 2010a). The reason is that short term
demand is very inelastic in the electricity spot markets (Holmberg, 2008). Hence,
the inelastic demand is often assumed in models of the electricity spot markets
(von der Fehr and Harbord, 1993; Holmberg, 2008).
By assuming demand to be inelastic, the demand quantity is not affected by
the market price. Due to the lack of demand response for inelastic demand, de-
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mand side bidding is strongly encouraged in the electricity spot markets. In some
spot markets, demand side bidding is introduced just like supply side bidding. For
example, demand side bidding is allowed in Norway, California and Spain electric-
ity spot markets (Woo et al., 2003; Baillo et al., 2004). By considering demand
side bidding, demand is usually formulated as a linear function in models of the
electricity spot markets (Allaz and Vila, 1993; Bushnell, 2007).
2.1.3 Trading procedures
In an electricity spot market where demand side bidding is not allowed, the ISO
collects the offers from supply side and forecasts the demand quantity. When
demand side bidding is allowed, the ISO collects the offers from the supply side and
the bids from the demand side. By ordering the offers and bids, both the supply
and demand functions are available. Then, MCP is determined by the supply
and demand. It is where the supply and demand matches. The ISO dispatches
electricity according to the MCP. The offers with price lower than or equal to the
MCP are accepted. Other offers are rejected in each period.
The pricing mechanism of the electricity spot market is used to decide the price
at which electricity should be traded in each period. In general, there are two
types of pricing mechanisms: uniform and pay-as-bid pricing mechanisms. With a
uniform pricing mechanism, all the electricity is traded at a unique price, which is
the highest price of all the accepted offers. Usually, this price is called MCP. Note
that the uniform pricing mechanism is used in the Australia and Singapore elec-
tricity spot markets (Hu et al., 2005; Energy Market Authority (EMA) Singapore,
2010a). With a pay-as-bid pricing mechanism, each single offer is isolated and each
trade is made according to its own offer price. The pay-as-bid pricing mechanism is
adopted in the United Kingdom electricity spot market, which is called the NETA
(Thomas, 2006).
Many researchers work on comparing the uniform and pay-as-bid pricing mech-
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anisms. For example, Wolfram (1999b) argued that the switching from the uniform
pricing mechanism to the pay-as-bid pricing mechanism may lead to inefficient pro-
duction. Rassenti et al. (2003) found that the pay-as-bid pricing mechanism can
reduce price volatility compared to the uniform pricing mechanism. However, the
prices submitted in the pay-as-bid pricing mechanism are higher than the prices
submitted in the uniform pricing mechanism. Xiong et al. (2004) compared these
two pricing mechanisms under multi-agent scenarios. They provided experimental
evidences to show that the pay-as-bid pricing mechanism may result in lower mar-
ket prices and price volatility than the uniform pricing mechanism. Fabra et al.
(2006) compared uniform and pay-as-bid pricing mechanisms in many scenarios,
such as revenue, consumer surplus and productive efficiency. They showed that
there is no obvious result on one pricing mechanism outperforming the other one.
Before submitting bids in the spot market, gencos and customers may sign
contracts on dispatching an amount of electricity (contract quantity) at a fixed
price (contract price). The signing of bilateral contracts is separated from the spot
market and can be seen as financial instruments without any actual transfer of
electricity.
Now, we review the electricity trading procedures as follows. Niu et al. (2005)
and Bushnell (2007) showed that gencos and customers may sign bilateral contracts
before the spot market. However, all the electricity should be traded at market
price in the spot market first. After that, customers get credit from gencos if market
price is greater than contract price; otherwise, customers pay debit to gencos. The
credit/debit is calculated as:
(market price - contract price)× contract quantity,
where if the amount is positive, it is credit; otherwise, it is debit. As a result,
contract quantity is sold at contract price. Any amount of electricity other than
contract quantity is sold at market price. Besides, we are also concerned with
the final price faced by customers. This price is called CP, which is combined by
14
2.2 Review of bilateral contracts
contract price and market price with trading-quantity weighted.
2.2 Review of bilateral contracts
Bilateral contracts are agreements between market participants to exchange elec-
tricity. It is an agreement involving an amount of electricity (contract quantity) and
a fixed price (contract price) for a certain time interval. The agreement associates
with a set of specified constraints, such as contract quantity, price, delivery time
and duration (El Khatib and Galiana, 2007). Bilateral contracts usually have two
forms: “futures” and “forward contracts”. Generally, futures have several fixed
formats and can be traded at any time on the secondary market until its deliv-
ery time (Hull, 1997). Forward contracts can be negotiated between gencos and
customers directly. They usually do not join the secondary market (Hull, 1998).
Moreover, bilateral contracts can be either physical or financial (El Khatib and
Galiana, 2007). By signing a physical bilateral contract, the genco does not need to
actually produce the amount of electricity signed and sell it to the customer. How-
ever, by signing a financial bilateral contract, the genco does not need to actually
produce the amount of electricity signed and the customer needs not to actually
buy that electricity. A financial bilateral contract considers the difference between
contract and market prices. If market price is higher than contract price, gencos
pay back the difference to customers. Otherwise, customers pay the difference to
gencos.
There are two types of bilateral contracts in the deregulated electricity markets:
vesting and forward contracts.
2.2.1 Vesting contracts
The vesting contract is a type of financial bilateral contract, which contains hedge
quantity, hedge price, delivery time and duration. Note that vesting contracts
are imposed by government, and are not for negotiation. The introduction of
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vesting contracts is for the prevention of price volatility and market power in the
initial stage of the deregulated electricity market (Energy Market Authority (EMA)
Singapore, 2010a).
Many countries introduce vesting contracts into their deregulated electricity
markets, such as Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and United Kingdom (An-
derson et al., 2007; Chang, 2007). The vesting contracts are introduced into the
deregulated Singapore electricity market in 2004 (Energy Market Authority (EMA)
Singapore, 2007). A large portion of demand is hedged in the Singapore electric-
ity market. In particular, 65% of the demand is covered from Quarter 1, 2004 to
Quarter 2, 2007. From Quarter 3, 2007 to Quarter 1, 2011, 55% of the demand is
covered. The level of vesting contracts in Singapore may be reduced in later years
(Energy Market Authority (EMA) Singapore, 2010b).
There are two types of vesting contracts in the initial stage of the deregulated
Australia electricity market (Chang, 2007). The first type of vesting contracts
is the two way bilateral contract. If market price is greater than contract price,
customers get credit from gencos. Otherwise, customers pay debit to gencos. The
second type of vesting contracts is a one way bilateral contract with a floor price
and a cap price. Usually, the cap price is much greater than the floor price. If
the market price is less than the floor price, the gencos receive the market price
plus the floor price. If the market price is between floor price and cap price, the
gencos receive the market price. If the market price is more than the cap price, the
gencos receive the cap price. Note that the vesting contracts are no longer used in
Australia (Anderson et al., 2007).
Many researchers examine the effectiveness of vesting contracts on the dereg-
ulated electricity market. Wolak (2000) analyzed the impact of vesting contracts
on the bidding strategies of gencos in the deregulated Australia electricity market.
He found that the market prices decrease as the hedge quantities increase. Kee
(2001) showed the advantage of vesting contracts in the initial stage of the deregu-
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lated electricity markets. He used California crises in 2000 and 2001, during which
vesting contracts are not signed, as an example to discuss the advantage of vesting
contracts. Ahn and Niemeyer (2007) also found that market prices decrease as the
hedge quantities increase. They pointed out that vesting contracts can also reduce
the incentive of new entry by setting an appropriate hedge price.
2.2.2 Forward contracts
The forward contract is a type of financial bilateral contracts which is signed vol-
untarily by gencos and customers. The difference between vesting and the forward
contracts is that the forward contracts are negotiated and the vesting contracts are
not. Since forward contracts are signed voluntarily, it forms an electricity forward
contract market along with the electricity spot market.
Some research works consider the unit commitment problem in the deregulated
electricity market. Valenzuela and Mazumdar (2003) and Kockar (2008) examined
the unit commitment problem for gencos, when both spot market and forward con-
tract market are available. Valenzuela and Mazumdar (2003) proposed a stochastic
program for gencos to schedule their units with uncertain MCP to maximize their
profits. Kockar (2008) considered the unit commitment problem with CO2 emission
cost.
Some participants with enormous electricity demand are called contestable cus-
tomers (Energy Market Authority (EMA) Singapore, 2010a). Their behaviors may
impact market prices. One example is Aluminum smelting industries. They con-
sume a lot of electricity for Aluminum electrolysis, which is called Hall-He´roult
process (Schwarz et al., 2001). Another example is the electricity retailers. The
retailers provide electricity to many real consumers. The contestable customers
have to bear the risks from demands and market prices. Instead, they a cumulate
enormous demands and have the power to bargain for better forward contracts.
These help them to manage the risk of market price. When both spot market
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and forward contract market are available, contestable customers can arbitrarily
choose mixed sources to meet their demands. Their mixing strategies are widely
investigated, such as Carrio´n et al. (2007a, 2007b).
The signing of bilateral contracts is one method used to control volatility of
MCP. Kaye et al. (1990) showed that bilateral contracts allow participants to lock
in a suitable price for electricity and avoid the adverse effects of price uncertainty.
Chang and Park (2007) presented that the introduction of vesting contracts may
reduce the variance of electricity prices in Singapore. Also, the signing of bilateral
contracts can control the market power. Kelman et al. (2001) pointed out that
the signing of bilateral contracts can reduce market power, which is measured by
the data of market prices. Joskow and Kahn (2002) observed that gencos who do
not exercise market power in the California electricity market had signed bilateral
contracts for most of their output.
Generally, there are two types of gencos: price takers and price makers. The
behaviors of price takers do not affect the electricity prices, while the behaviors
of price makers do. Conejo et al. (2002) and Valenzuela and Mazumdar (2003)
examined behaviors of price takers. De La Torre et al. (2002) examined how
the bidding behaviors of price makers affect the market price. Besides, there are
considerable literature examining the bidding behaviors of price makers when both
spot market and forward contract market are available, for example, Mielczarski
et al. (1999) and Niu et al. (2005).
2.3 Review of price volatility
In the deregulated electricity market, electricity prices depend on several factors,
such as supply, demand, bilateral contracts and network conditions. The supply
and the demand are volatile. Then, the resulting price based on the volatile supply
and demand is also volatile. Price volatility refers to the unpredictable fluctuations
of the electricity prices over time (Zareipour et al., 2007). The measurements of
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price volatility include price velocity, standard deviation of price returns, VaR and
CVaR, as well as variance of MCP.
2.3.1 Price velocity
Price velocity is the daily average normalized hourly change in electricity price (Li
and Flynn, 2004). Li and Flynn (2004) defined two types of price velocity. The
first type of price velocity is the sum of absolute value of price change in one day
as a fraction of the overall average price of the studied periods. The price change
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where m is the number of periods in one day, n is the number of days being studied,
pi,j is the price of period j in day i and p










The second type of price velocity is the sum of absolute value of price change in
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Li and Flynn (2004) used these two types of price velocities to examine 14 deregu-
lated electricity markets. They found that the price velocities of these 14 markets
vary widely.
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2.3.2 Standard deviation of price returns
Volatility can also be measured by the standard deviation of price returns. There
are two definitions of price return. The first definition of price return is the dif-
ference between actual price and expected price (Benini et al., 2004). The second
definition of price return is the difference between prices over a period divided by
the price at the beginning of the period (Zareipour et al., 2007). Standard deviation





where n is the number of periods studied, ui is the price return in period i and u¯
is the mean of ui for the n studied periods.
Benini et al. (2004) studied standard deviation of price returns in the Spain,
California, United Kingdom and Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland (PJM) markets
from 1999 to 2000. They found that the standard deviation of price returns in-
creases as the electricity prices increase. Zareipour et al. (2007) examined both
standard deviation of price returns and price velocity in the Ontario electricity
market as well as the New England, New York and PJM electricity markets. The
results showed that the price volatility in Ontario is higher than the price volatility
in New England, New York and PJM.
2.3.3 Value-at-Risk and Conditional Value-at-Risk
Volatility can also be measured by VaR and CVaR. VaR is a measure developed by
the financial industry. It measures the expected maximum loss over a certain time
horizon within a given confidence interval. Given a confidence level α ∈ (0, 1), the
VaR of an asset at the confidence level α is given by the smallest number x such
that the probability that the loss X of this asset exceeds x is not larger than 1−α.
It is expressed as
Vα = inf{x ∈ R : P (X > x) ≤ 1− α},
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where Vα is the VaR with confidence level α over a certain time horizon and P (X >
x) is the probability that the loss X exceeds x. Dahlgren et al. (2001) measured
the price volatility by VaR to study the California electricity market during the
summer of 2000. They proposed some remedies for the problems in the California
electricity market.
CVaR is defined as the conditional expectation of losses given that the loss
exceeds a threshold value (Alexander et al., 2006). It is also referred to as expected







where V Cα is the CVaR with confidence level α over a certain time horizon and Vγ
is the VaR with confidence level γ over a certain time horizon.
2.3.4 Variance
Variance of MCP is a measure of how far away a set of prices are from each other.
Many researchers study the variance of MCP in the electricity market. Mount
(2001) studied price volatility by using the variance of MCP. He found that the
price volatility decreases as the number of gencos increases. Chang and Park (2007)
examined the variance of empirical electricity prices to investigate the market struc-
tures adopted in Singapore electricity market. Ruibal and Mazumdar (2008) con-
sidered the variances of equilibrium prices of the Cournot and SFE models. They
found that the variance of equilibrium prices of the Cournot model decreases and
the variance of equilibrium prices of the SFE model increases as the number of
gencos increases.
Also, many researchers work on the impact of bilateral contracts on the price
volatility. For example, Chang and Park (2007) studied the impact of vesting
contracts on the volatility of MCP in Singapore electricity markets by using the
standard deviation of price (square root of the variance). Sapio and Wylomanska
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(2008) studied the impact of forward contracts on the price volatility measured by
standard deviation of price returns.
2.4 Review of market power
In a monopoly market or an oligopoly market, gencos adopt bidding strategies to
maximize their own profits. This ability of a genco to use bidding strategies is called
market power (Wolak, 2000). The deregulated electricity markets are expected to
be competitive. However, market power does exist in some electricity markets. For
example, Woo et al. (2003) examined the market power in the United Kingdom,
Norway, Alberta and California electricity markets. They found that market power
exists in all these four markets. Mount (2001) showed that the gencos with market
power can increase electricity prices. In this case, consumers suffer from high
electricity prices. Other than the data of market prices, the data of market shares
and profits are also used to measure market power. Generally, there are two types
of indexes: structural and behavioral indexes.
2.4.1 Structural indexes
The structural indexes show the level of market concentration or the position of
a genco in the market. These indexes include the k-firm concentration ratios
(CR), Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI), supply margin assessment (SMA), resid-
ual supply index (RSI), dominance measure (DM) and must-run ratio (MRR). They
can be found in much literature, such as Gan and Bourcier (2002), Chang (2007)
and Melnik et al. (2008).
Concentration ratios (CR)
The CR is the sum of ratios of market share of the k largest gencos (Chang, 2007).
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where si is the ratio of market share of genco i. Note that the market share is
based on the generation capacity. From now on, when we refer market share, it
is based on the generation capacity. The less the CR value is, the less the market
concentration level is.
Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI)
The HHI is named after its inventors, Orris Clemens Herfindahl (Herfindahl, 1950)
and Albert Otto Hirschman (Hirschman, 1945). It is the sum of squares of ratios






where si is the ratio of market share of genco i and n is the total number of
gencos. The HHI value ranges from 1 to 1002. Note that the less the HHI value
is, the less the market concentration level is. According to the United States
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (United States Department of Justice/Federal Trade
Commission, 2010), a market with HHI value less than 1500 is considered to be
free of market concentration. A market with HHI value between 1500 and 2500
is considered moderately concentrated and a market with HHI value greater than
2500 is considered highly concentrated.
Supply margin assessment (SMA)
The SMA is used to test whether market demand can be met without a certain
genco (Chang, 2007). It is expressed as
Ui = D −Q−i,
where D is the market demand and Q−i is the total generation capacity of the
market other than the generation capacity of genco i. If Ui is positive, the genco i
is pivotal in the market.
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Residual supply index (RSI)
Similar to SMA, the RSI is also used to test whether a genco is pivotal in the





where D is the market demand and Q−i is the total generation capacity of the
market other than the generation capacity of genco i. If the ratio is less than 1,
then, genco i is said to have market power. Note that the lower the ratio is, the
higher the market power of genco i is. The SMA and RSI can be converted to each
other once D is known.
Dominance measure (DM)
The DM is used to test whether a genco has a dominant position in the electricity













where γ > 0 is an exogenous parameter and si is the ratio of market share of the
i’s largest genco, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The genco whose market share is greater than
sd is considered to have a dominant position.
Must-run ratio (MRR)
The CR, HHI, SMA, RSI and DM do not consider transmission constraints, which
play a significant role in the ability of a genco to exercise market power. The MRR
does consider the transmission constraints in different zones of the deregulated
electricity markets (Gan and Bourcier, 2002). It is expressed as
Mi =
D − I −Q−i
qi
,
where D is the demand and I is the import limit of the zone. Moreover, Q−i is
the total generation capacity of the market other than the generation capacity of
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genco i in the zone and qi is the generation capacity of genco i in the zone. This
index calculates the market power of a genco in a given zone. Note that the lower
the MRR is, the lower the market power of the genco in the zone is.
Many researchers use structural indexes as measurements of the market power.
For example, MRR is used to test the market power in the United Kingdom elec-
tricity market (Gan and Bourcier, 2002). Wang et al. (2004) discussed market
power assessment in detail by using MRR. Chang (2007) applied CR, HHI, SMA
and RSI to measure market power in the Singapore electricity market. Hellmer and
Wa˚rell (2009) used HHI and DM to measure market power in the Nordic electricity
market.
2.4.2 Behavioral indexes
The behavioral indexes are directly generated from the data of market prices. They
include Lerner Index and the variations of Lerner Index (Chang, 2007; Nanduri and
Das, 2007). Also, the data of profits are directly used to measure market power.
For example, Nanduri and Das (2007) proposed the revenue-based market power
indicator (RMPI) which is generated from the data of profits.
Lerner Index
The Lerner Index considers the distance between market price and marginal cost
(Chang, 2007). It is a relative difference defined as
L = P − C
P
,
where P is the market price and C is the marginal cost. If L is 0, it means the
market is a perfect competition market. Note that the lower the Lerner Index is,
the lower the market power is.
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Revenue-based market power indicator (RMPI)
Nanduri and Das (2007) proposed RMPI as a measurement of market power. It is
the net profit (revenue minus cost) and is expressed as
E = R− PC ,
where R is the revenue and PC is the production cost. Note that the lower the
RMPI is, the lower the market power is.
The Lerner Index and RMPI are widely discussed in literature. Wolfram (1999a)
used Lerner Index to study the market power in the United Kingdom electricity
market from 1992 to 1994. He showed that the empirical prices are not as high
as the prices that the theoretical models predict. Puller (2007) examined the
California electricity market from 1998 to 2000. He found that empirical prices
are nearly as high as the prices predicted by the theoretical models. Chang (2007)
used Lerner Index as well as some structural indexes to test market power in the
Singapore electricity market. Nanduri and Das (2007) proposed a variation of
Lerner Index, which uses average quantity weighted price instead of average price.
They also used RMPI as a measurement of market power in their paper. Ciarreta
and Esponosa (2009) proposed a lower bound of Lerner Index to test if market
power exists in the Spain electricity market.
2.5 Review of oligopoly models
In this section, we review two different oligopoly models, Cournot and SFE models.
Generally, gencos compete by making decisions on quantities in the Cournot mod-
els. In the SFE models, the gencos make decisions on supply function. Although
the decision variables for Cournot and SFE models are different, these two mod-
els are both equilibrium models. That is, both models achieve Nash equilibrium
when each genco’s strategy is the best response to other genco’s actual strategies
(Ventosa et al., 2005).
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2.5.1 The Cournot model
The Cournot model was first proposed by Cournot in 1838 (Cournot, 1838). In
this model, gencos make the decision on the amount of electricity that they are
willing to supply. The Cournot model is a well known oligopoly model studied by
many researchers (Gibbons, 1992; Ventosa et al., 2005).
Without bilateral contracts, each genco maximizes its profit by making the de-
cision on the quantity that it is willing to supply into the market. Then, the ISO
dispatches electricity according to the offers from the gencos and the demand quan-
tity. The problem of a single genco can be modeled as a two-level program (Hobbs
et al., 2000, Vespucci et al., 2010). The first level is the genco decision problem
which is modeled by the Cournot model. The second level is the ISO problem where
the ISO obtains the market price by matching supply and demand. The first level
problem can be solved by considering the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality condi-
tions, which are related to the second level problem. The two-level optimization
problem is a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) prob-
lem. Since the problem of each genco can be formulated as an MPEC problem, the
equilibrium among these MPEC problems is an Equilibrium Problem with Equi-
librium Constraints (EPEC). Some algorithms are proposed to solve the EPEC
(Hobbs et al., 2000; Vespucci et al., 2010).
Recently, some researchers have provided a model for both: the spot market
and the forward market. The objective of gencos is to maximize their own profits
in both markets. The forward contracts are signed before the spot market. Hence,
this two market problem can be seen as a two-period problem (Yao et al., 2008).
In the first period, the decision variable for each genco is the bilateral contracts.
In the second period, the decision variable for each genco is the quantity that the
genco is willing to supply into the spot market. From above, the problem of a
single genco without considering bilateral contracts (the second period problem)
can be formulated as an MPEC problem. As a result, these two markets are usually
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modeled as a two-period EPEC problem, in which each genco faces an individual
MPEC problem.
Many researchers examine the effects of the existence of forward contracts on
the Cournot models. With bilateral contracts, Allaz and Vila (1993) presented
two suppliers Cournot models and investigated the impact of bilateral contracts
on the market prices. In the model, they assume a linear demand function, the
same quadratic production cost for suppliers and no arbitrage. The no arbitrage
assumption says that the contract price is equal to the spot market price. Allaz
and Vila (1993) showed that the forward market equilibrium can be obtained in
closed form in their model. Bushnell (2007) extended this model and considered
multiple gencos in the deregulated electricity market.
In Allaz and Vila (1993) and Bushnell (2007), production costs of gencos are
assumed to be identical. For gencos with different production costs, Su (2007)
showed the existence of optimal solutions for the deterministic two-period EPEC
problem. Yao et al. (2008) modeled the two settlement electricity markets into an
EPEC problem and introduced an algorithm which uses an iterative approach to
solve the EPEC problem. Zhang et al. (2010) proposed a stochastic EPEC problem
where market demand is uncertain. They discussed the relationship between spot
and forward markets.
The Cournot model is also widely used to study the price volatility and the
market power issues. Sapio and Wylomanska (2008) applied the Cournot model to
study the price volatility which is measured by the standard deviation of price re-
turns. They found that forward contracts significantly influence the price volatility
in both theoretical analysis and simulation studies. For fixed bilateral contracts,
the price volatility is increased by the introduction of these contracts. However,
if bilateral contracts are allowed, the price volatility can be controlled by signing
proper contracts. Also, the Cournot model is applied to analyze market power.
Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) formulated the California market as a Cournot
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model. They found that the availability of hydroelectric production and the elas-
ticity of demand are the two important factors on the market power.
There are limitations of the Cournot models. Generally, gencos’ decisions are
the quantities that they are willing to supply. However, in the electricity markets,
gencos submit a set of quantity and price offers which cannot be captured in the
Cournot model. To overcome the limitations of the Cournot model, there are two
extensions: the conjectural variation and the conjectural supply function models
(Day et al., 2002). In the conjectural variation model, a constant conjectural
variation is introduced. It is defined as the first derivative of total quantities with
respect to quantity of the genco under consideration. In the conjectural supply
function model, the relationship between total quantities of all gencos and market
price is formulated as a supply function.
2.5.2 The SFE model
The SFE model was first proposed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989). In the SFE
model, each genco determines its own supply function. Its goal is to maximize its
own profit. Bolle (1992) and Green and Newbery (1992) first applied the SFE model
to the deregulated electricity market. Bolle (1992) investigated three different
characteristics of the spot market by using the SFE model. Green and Newbery
(1992) studied a SFE model where each genco supplies a smooth supply function.
They used this model to find optimal supply functions in the United Kingdom
electricity market. After that, the SFE models have been widely used to formulate
the deregulated electricity markets.
In order to obtain the SFE, a set of differential equations needs to be solved.
Thus, there may be no equilibrium or multiple equilibriums. There are some re-
strictions by which the number of equilibriums can be reduced. The first restriction
is the capacity constraint (Green and Newbery, 1992; Newbery, 1998; Genc and
Reynolds, 2010). This restriction is reasonable since all gencos have limited gener-
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ation capacities. The second restriction is the cap price (Baldick and Hogan, 2002;
Genc and Reynolds, 2010). The cap price policy specifies the maximum price that
gencos can submit and is enforced in many deregulated electricity markets, such as
Australia, California and Alberta (Woo et al., 2003; Hu et al., 2005; Anderson and
Davison, 2008). The third restriction concerns the marginal cost. By assuming
constant marginal cost (Newbery, 1998; Holmberg, 2007) or linear marginal cost
(Klemperer and Meyer, 1989; Baldick et al., 2004), the number of equilibriums can
be reduced. The fourth restriction is the uncertainty of demand (Klemperer and
Meyer, 1989). Lastly, the supply functions that gencos can submit also affect the
equilibriums (Baldick, 2002; Anderson and Xu, 2005).
Since it is difficult to calculate the equilibrium for general SFE, much literature
considers symmetric and linear SFE models. For the symmetric SFE models, all
gencos have the same production cost function. With demand uncertainty, Klem-
perer and Meyer (1989) assumed that symmetric gencos submit general supply
functions and proved the existence of SFE. They also gave sufficient conditions for
uniqueness of SFE. Rudkevich et al. (1998) studied the SFE model where symmet-
ric gencos submit smooth supply functions. In their model, gencos have piecewise
linear and convex cost functions. Moreover, demand is assumed to be inelastic
and uncertain. Anderson and Philpott (2002) extended the model of Rudkevich
et al. (1998) to symmetric gencos with arbitrary convex cost functions. However,
the SFEs of Rudkevich et al. (1998) and Anderson and Philpott (2002) may be
multiple. To have a unique SFE, more restrictions are needed. Holmberg (2008)
showed the existence of a unique SFE under conditions of symmetric gencos, in-
elastic demand, cap prices and capacity constraints.
In the linear SFE models, each genco submits a linear supply function into
the electricity spot market. Green (1996) considered linear SFE models where
asymmetric gencos have linear marginal cost functions and demand is assumed to be
linear. He applied this model to study the United Kingdom electricity spot market.
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Baldick et al. (2004) extended the model of Green (1996) by allowing gencos to
submit piecewise affine supply function and also applied it to the United Kingdom
electricity market. They found that piecewise affine SFE solutions provided good
matches to the empirical data of the United Kingdom electricity market. Rudkevich
(2005) analyzed a SFE model similar to Green (1996) by using a learning process.
He demonstrated that the learning process converges to a linear SFE. In a general
SFE model, asymmetric gencos who have general production cost functions submit
general supply functions. In this case, there are no perfect analytical results that
can be used to calculate the general SFE. Hence, a numerical algorithm is developed
to approximate the general SFE (Holmberg, 2009).
Many researchers examine the impact of bilateral contracts on the SFE. For
example, Newbery (1998) studied the impact of bilateral contracts on the SFE
of a linear SFE model. In the model, gencos have the same constant marginal
cost and demand is linear. Niu et al. (2005) presented a linear SFE model where
asymmetric gencos have linear marginal cost functions and demand is linear. They
applied this SFE model to the electricity market of the Electric Reliability Council
of Texas (ERCOT) and found that this model is able to capture features of bidding
behaviors in the ERCOT market. Anderson and Xu (2005) studied the influence
of the bilateral contract on the optimal supply functions. The constraints of their
model are limited generation capacities and cap prices.
The SFE models are also used to study price volatility and market power issues.
Ruibal and Mazumdar (2008) studied the variances of equilibrium prices of many
models, including Cournot and SFE models. They found that the price variance
of Cournot model decreases as the number of gencos increases. However, the price
variance of SFE model increases as the number of gencos increases. The SFE model
is also applied to analyze market power. Borenstein et al. (1995) estimated the
market power by using Cournot and SFE models. They stated that the calculation
of the equilibriums of Cournot and SFE models can provide an important indicator
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of the potential of market power. That is because the production costs of gencos and
the demand function in the models are estimated by historical data. Green (1999)
studied a supply function competition approach which originated with Klemperer
and Meyer (1989) and adopted by Bolle (1992) and Green and Newbery (1992).
He showed that gencos may hedge most of their output in the spot market with
forward contracts.
In the spot electricity markets, the gencos are required to submit a finite set
of offers (quantity and price pairs) which will result in a step function. However,
numerous researchers study the continuous supply function. Thus, there is a gap
between research studies of step supply function and continuous supply function.
Holmberg et al. (2008) showed the step function converges to the continuous supply
function as the number of offers increases.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have reviewed five areas. They are market mechanism, bilateral
contracts, price volatility, market power and oligopoly models. We have also exam-
ined the literature which studies the interaction among multiple areas. However,
there is little or no research work regarding three interactions among multiple areas.
Firstly, there is little literature regarding the mathematical analysis of the impact
of vesting contracts on the price volatility. Thus, we attempt to build mathemati-
cal models and analyze how vesting contracts affect the uncertainties of MCP and
CP in Chapter 3.
Secondly, many researchers focus on the equilibrium under different settings of
the SFE and Cournot models. However, to the best of our knowledge, they did
not examine the impact of bilateral contracts on the price variance in the SFE and
Cournot models. In this thesis, we are interested in studying this problem.
Thirdly, indexes that are proposed to measure the market power do not capture
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the relative profit. The structural indexes use only the data of market shares,
while the behavioral indexes use only the data of market prices and marginal costs.
Although RMPI directly considers the data of profits, we are interested in finding
the relative increase in profit to measure market power. Therefore, we propose an
index using the data of profits to measure market power.
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Chapter 3
Single Genco with Vesting
Contracts
3.1 Introduction
Electricity industries were vertically integrated monopolies in most areas of the
world before the 1980s (Joskow, 2008). However, these monopolies were inefficient.
Joskow (1998) observed that high operating costs, high prices and lack of new
investment existed in such systems. Thus, many countries reformed their electricity
industries by the introduction of a market mechanism, such as Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, California, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, the Nordic countries and United
Kingdom (Chang, 2007; Joskow, 2008).
Singapore began its electricity industry reform in 1995 (Energy Market Au-
thority (EMA) Singapore, 2010a). Changes involve privatization of state-owned
monopolies, adjustments to regulations and creation of an electricity market. A
wholesale market was developed in 2003 (Energy Market Authority (EMA) Singa-
pore, 2008). Every half an hour, an MCP is determined by offers, demands and
other system inputs. Generally, this MCP is unstable due to high storage cost,
unstable supply and unstable demand.
To provide a stable environment, the Singapore government uses vesting con-
tracts as a risk management tool. These vesting contracts are bilateral contracts
that contain values of hedge quantity and hedge price, delivery time and duration.
The hedge price is the fixed price at which gencos are required to sell electricity and
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the hedge quantity is the fixed amount of electricity which gencos must sell at the
hedge price. In Singapore, the vesting contracts are imposed by the government
and are not negotiated.
In microeconomics, MCP is the equilibrium price determined by supply and
demand. In a market with hedges, participants are required to trade the hedge
quantity at the hedge price. This means that a portion of the supply and de-
mand is satisfied by hedges. As a result, participants have two trading prices: the
hedge price and the MCP. The trading-quantity weighted price is called CP. Chang
and Park (2007) showed that the hedge price and hedge quantity may reduce the
variance of MCP in Singapore by examining data.
However, an improper hedge price and quantity may discourage new investors
and may be detrimental to participants’ profit, thereby discouraging new invest-
ment (Ahn and Niemeyer, 2007). As a result, the wholesale market may become
less competitive and efficient. Thus, we are interested in exploring and analyzing
the impact of hedge price and quantity on the uncertainties of MCP and CP. Our
goal is to study the effects of hedge prices and quantities and ensure a stable market
environment.
There is little literature regarding the mathematical analysis of the effects of
hedge price and hedge quantity. In this chapter, we consider an unstable envi-
ronment where participants are required to trade the hedge quantity at the hedge
price. In addition, participants offer the quantities and prices they are willing to
buy or sell in the market. We assume that the supply is a discrete function of
uncertainty and participants have zero expectation on the extra profit caused by
the hedging price and quantity.
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we develop two mathematical models and analyze how
the hedge price and quantity affect the uncertainties of MCP and CP. We discover
that having hedge quantity increases the variance of MCP and simultaneously
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reduces the variance of CP. We also find that the hedge price has no effect on
the variances of MCP and CP. In Section 3.4, we use data from the Singapore
electricity market to test our models. Conclusions are presented in Section 3.5.
3.2 Analytical model 1
Supply and demand are the two critical factors that influence the wholesale electric-
ity trading. The supply rises as the price rises. This positive relationship between
price and supply is called the law of supply (McConnell and Brue, 2008). It is
due to the increasing marginal production cost, i.e. the added cost of producing
one more unit of electricity. In our model, we assume that price is a function of
supply. This function is called the “supply function”. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the supply function is nondecreasing with quantity.
In Singapore, gencos provide offers to the market to denote the amount of
electricity they offer at the corresponding price. Much research shows that the
Singapore electricity market is workably competitive, such as Chang (2007) and
Chang and Lee (2008). So, we believe that gencos make offers according to their
production costs, generating unit availability and other related factors without
strategic behavior. The production cost is uncertain due to uncertain fuel prices.
Thus, we assume that the supply function is uncertain. The model assumes that
gencos bid based on costs and does not consider unplanned generation outages.
This is the limitation of our model.
Currently, there is no demand side bidding for electricity in Singapore. For
each period, the demand is estimated based on historical data and unresponsive
to market price (Energy Market Authority (EMA) Singapore, 2010a). This means
that the realized historical demand for each period would be the same under any
price scenario. Thus, we assume that the demand is inelastic without uncertainty
36
3.2 Analytical model 1
in our model.
In the Singapore electricity market, offers are sorted based on their prices (En-
ergy Market Authority (EMA) Singapore, 2010a). To supply a certain quantity,
offers with lower prices are matched first. The equilibrium price where the sup-
ply and demand quantity matches in the market is called MCP and the matched
quantity is called MCQ. In our model, the demand is a constant, which is derived
from actual data. Thus, the MCQ is equal to demand quantity. The MCP is the
price where the supply quantity is equal to the demand quantity. In the electricity
market, all electricity is traded at MCP.
The Singapore government uses hedge price and hedge quantity as a risk man-
agement tool. Since a portion of electricity is required to be sold at the hedge
price, gencos may lose money from a low hedge price or gain extra profit from a
high hedge price. Define P¯ and Q¯ as the hedge price and quantity, respectively.
Define R as the profit arising from the hedge price and quantity.
The gencos may consider some strategies to raise the market prices to sky high
in order to maximize their expected profit. However, in the long run, the Singa-
pore government expects to achieve competitively electricity prices in the electricity
market (Energy Market Authority (EMA) Singapore, 2010a). The Singapore gov-
ernment may take actions to make participants’ profit reasonable and to keep the
market competitive and efficient. Hence, gencos have to consider the long-run
equilibrium and the impact of these strategies is unknown. As a result, in a single
period, gencos may consider a simple and fair strategy: having zero expectation on
the extra profit caused by hedging price and quantity. In our model, we assume
that gencos estimate the demand over and above the hedge quantity to be L and
adjust their offer prices to balance the profit, R, with L for zero expectation. We
call this procedure “neutralization”. That is, we assume that the extra profit aris-
ing from the hedge price and quantity, R, will be neutralized by selling additional
L quantity of electricity. Moreover, we assume that the changes of prices for all
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the additional L quantity of electricity are the same. Define h as the adjustment
of prices to neutralize the profit R. We have h = −R/L. In Figure 3.1, the hedge
price is set low. In this case, gencos receive negative profit to provide an amount
of electricity equal to hedge quantity. They will neutralize this profit in the next
L quantity. Hence, the prices of intervals are increased by h.
We also divide the supply quantity into three intervals: I1 = (0, Q¯], I2 = (Q¯, Q¯+
L], I3 = (Q¯ + L, Qˆ], where Q¯ is the hedge quantity assigned by the government
and Qˆ is the generation capacity. Interval I1 is the hedge interval, interval I2 is the
neutralization interval and interval I3 is the interval after neutralization. Market
forces imply that 0 < Q¯ < Qˆ.
Figure 3.1: Neutralization of profit R
3.2.1 Notations
The following notations are used in this chapter.
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Table 3.1: Notations used in analytical models 1 and 2
Qsi = Supply quantity of offer i, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
where 0 = Qs0 < Q
s
1 < · · · < Qsm = Qˆ
P si = Supply price of offer i, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
where P s1 < P
s





i ], for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
where ai is the quantity interval that offer i holds
Ai = |ai|, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
x = Electricity quantity produced
F (x) = Original supply function
Ps = Market clearing price (MCP) without contracts, where Ps ≥ 0




P¯ = Hedge price, where P¯ ≥ 0
Q¯ = Hedge quantity, where Q¯ > 0
Qˆ = Generation capacity, where Q¯ < Qˆ
L = Estimated demand beyond hedge quantity,
where L>0 and Q¯+ L is the estimated demand
I1 = (0, Q¯]
I2 = (Q¯, Q¯+ L]
I3 = (Q¯+ L, Qˆ]
R = Profit arising from hedge price and hedge quantity
f(x) = Adjusted supply function with hedge price and hedge quantity
Qd = Actual demand quantity, where Qd ∈ (Q¯, Qˆ]
ω = Hedge ratio, where ω ∈ (0, 1]
= Q¯/Qd
Pˆs = MCP with contracts, where Pˆs ≥ 0
Pˆ cs = CP with contracts, where Pˆ
c
s ≥ 0
= ωP¯ + (1− ω)Pˆs
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3.2.2 Assumptions
We make the following three assumptions.
Assumption 3-1. Supply is a discrete function of uncertainty.
By reordering m offers with prices, the supply function is
F (x) = P si + εi, for x ∈ ai, (3.1)




i ] is the quantity interval that gencos are willing to supply




2 < · · · < P sm from the law of supply.
Also, εi are identically distributed random variables with V ar(εi) = σ
2, for i =
1, 2, . . . ,m.
Since most of the generating units in Singapore rely on fuel oil and natural gas,
the uncertainties may be highly correlated. We assume that εi, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
are independent or pairwise positively correlated. That is, ρεi,εj ∈ [0, 1], where
ρεi,εj is the correlation coefficient of εi and εj, for i, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Assumption 3-2. Demand quantity is inelastic.
With no demand side bidding for electricity in Singapore, the demand is esti-
mated based on historical data and may be unresponsive to market price in short
period of time. In the model, we assume that the demand quantity is constant Qd,
independent of the price. Hence, the MCQ is equal to Qd. Also, Qd ∈ (Q¯, Qˆ]. This
implies that the demand is larger than the hedge quantity and no larger than the
generation capacity. Further, Q¯ ∈ ak0 and Qd ∈ ak1 , where k0 and k1 ∈ ZZ and
1 ≤ k0 ≤ k1 ≤ m.
Assumption 3-3. With given hedge price and hedge quantity, the genco
neutralizes R in interval I2.
We assume that the adjusted supply function is parallel to the original supply
function in I2 and unchanged in I3. With the given hedge price and hedge quantity,
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we define the adjusted supply function as
f(x) =

P¯ , for x ∈ I1,
fI2(x), for x ∈ I2,





i + εi + h, for x ∈ ai ∩ I2, (3.3)
fI3(x) = F (x) = P
s
i + εi, for x ∈ ai ∩ I3. (3.4)
The constant h = −R/L is the adjustment of offer prices in I2, in order to neutralize
revenue.
3.2.3 MCP without hedge price and hedge quantity
From Assumption 3-2, MCQ is equal to Qd and Qd ∈ ak1 . Thus, the MCP is equal
to Ps = F (Qd) = P
s
k1
+ εk1 when no hedge price and hedge quantity are given.
Consequently, the variance of MCP without hedge price and hedge quantity is
V ar(Ps) = V ar(P
s
k1
+ εk1) = V ar(εk1) = σ
2. (3.5)
3.2.4 MCP with hedge price and hedge quantity
In this section, we show that the hedge quantity increases the volatility of MCP.
We first examine the adjusted supply function when the hedge price, P¯ , and hedge
quantity, Q¯, are given. From Equation (3.2), the adjusted supply function, f(x),
is decided by hedge price, P¯ , and hedge quantity, Q¯, in interval I1. In interval I2,
f(x) = fI2(x) = P
s
i + εi + h.
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In interval I3,
f(x) = fI3(x) = P
s
i + εi.
The MCP is equal to Pˆs = f(Qd) when hedge price and hedge quantity are
given. From Assumption 3-2, Qd ∈ (Q¯, Qˆ]. We consider two cases: Qd ∈ I2 and
Qd ∈ I3.
Case 1. Qd ∈ I2.














i=1 Aiεi + (Q¯−Qsk0−1)εk0
L
. (3.7)
Consequently, the variance of MCP with hedge price and hedge quantity is






















where set K = {1, 2, . . . , k0} ∪ {k1}. Moreover, Ci = Ai/L, for i = 1, 2, . . . , k0 − 1,
Ck0 = (Q¯−Qsk0−1)/L and Ck1 = 1. Equation (3.8) holds because εi are identically
distributed random variables, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Case 2. Qd ∈ I3.




+ εk1 . (3.9)
Thus, the variance of MCP with hedge price and hedge quantity is
V ar(fI3(Qd)) = V ar(P
s
k1
+ εk1) = V ar(εk1) = σ
2. (3.10)
We now show that the variance of MCP does not decrease when the hedge
quantity is introduced.
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Theorem 3.1. For ρεiεj ∈ [0, 1], V ar(Pˆs) ≥ V ar(Ps).
Proof. From Assumption 3-2, Qd ∈ (Q¯, Qˆ]. There are two cases: Qd ∈ I2 and
Qd ∈ I3.
Case 1. Qd ∈ I2.


















where Equation (3.11) holds because Q¯ > Qsk0−1, Ci ≥ 0 for all i ∈ K and ρεi,εj ≥ 0.
Case 2. Qd ∈ I3.
We have
V ar(fI3(Qd)) = σ
2 = V ar(Ps), (3.12)
where Equation (3.12) holds from Equations (3.5) and (3.10).
From cases 1 and 2, since Pˆs = f(Qd), we have V ar(Pˆs) ≥ V ar(Ps).
Next, we show other factors that affect the variance of the MCP.
Theorem 3.2. For Qd ∈ I2 and ρεiεj ∈ [0, 1], V ar(Pˆs) is a decreasing function
of L, an increasing function of Q¯ and independent of P¯ . Moreover, for Qd ∈ I3,
V ar(Pˆs) is independent of L, Q¯ and P¯ .
Proof. For Qd ∈ I2 and ρεiεj ∈ [0, 1], we have that V ar(fI2(Qd)) is a constant
function of P¯ from Equation (3.8). Similarly, V ar(fI2(Qd)) is a decreasing function
of L because Q¯−Qsk0−1 ≥ 0, Ai ≥ 0, for i = 1, 2, . . . , k0 − 1, and ρεi,εj ≥ 0, for
i, j ∈ K. Also, from Equation (3.8), V ar(fI2(Qd)) is an increasing function of Q¯
because Ai ≥ 0, for i = 1, 2, . . . , k0 − 1, and ρεi,εj ≥ 0, for i, j ∈ K.
For Qd ∈ I3, we have that V ar(fI3(Qd)) is a constant function of L, Q¯ and P¯
from Equation (3.10).
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3.2.5 CP
In this section, we show that the volatility of MCP increased from the hedge quan-
tity is not enough to overcome the stabilizing influence of the preset hedge price.
As a result, the hedge quantity reduces the volatility of CP.
When the hedge quantities are zero, customers purchase all their electricity
from the wholesale market at the MCP. Thus, the CP without hedge price and
hedge quantity is P cs = Ps.
On the other hand, for positive hedge quantities, customers pay the hedge price,
P¯ , for the hedge quantity, Q¯. To meet the demand, customers buy the remaining
Qd − Q¯ units of electricity from the wholesale market with MCP, Pˆs. We define
the CP as
Pˆ cs = ωP¯ + (1− ω)Pˆs
=
{
ωP¯ + (1− ω)fI2(Qd), for Qd ∈ I2,
ωP¯ + (1− ω)fI3(Qd), for Qd ∈ I3,
(3.13)
where ω = Q¯/Qd is the hedge ratio and Equation (3.13) holds from Equation (3.2)
for Qd ∈ (Q¯, Qˆ].
We now consider two cases: Qd ∈ I2 and Qd ∈ I3.
Case 1. Qd ∈ I2.
The CP with hedge price and hedge quantity is
Pˆ cs = ωP¯ + (1− ω)
(
















where Equation (3.14) holds from Equations (3.7) and (3.13). Similar to Equa-
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tion (3.8), the variance of CP with hedge price and hedge quantity is
V ar(Pˆ cs ) = V ar
[
ωP¯ + (1− ω)
(




























where Equation (3.15) holds because εi are identically distributed random variables,
for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Case 2. Qd ∈ I3.
The CP with hedge price and hedge quantity is
Pˆ cs = ωP¯ + (1− ω)(P sk1 + εk1), (3.16)
where Equation (3.16) holds from Equations (3.9) and (3.13). Thus, the variance
of CP with hedge price and hedge quantity is
V ar(Pˆ cs ) = (1− ω)2σ2. (3.17)
We now show that the variance of CP decreases when hedge quantity is assigned.















where the inequality holds from Q¯ < Qd ≤ Q¯+ L. Thus,












































where ω = Q¯/Qd and the inequality holds from Equation (3.18).
Theorem 3.3. For ρεiεj ∈ [0, 1], V ar(Pˆ cs ) ≤ V ar(P cs ).
Proof. Consider two cases: Qd ∈ I2 and Qd ∈ I3.
Case 1. Qd ∈ I2.
From Equations (3.5) and (3.15),























= V ar(P cs ),
where Inequality (3.19) holds because ρεi,εj ≤ 1 for any i, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Inequal-
ity (3.20) holds from Lemma 3.1.
Case 2. Qd ∈ I3.
Since 0 < ω ≤ 1,
V ar(Pˆ cs ) = (1− ω)2σ2
< σ2
= V ar(Ps)
= V ar(P cs ),
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where the inequality holds from Equations (3.5) and (3.17).
Note that in Theorem 3.3, V ar(Pˆ cs ) is equal to V ar(P
c
s ) if and only if Qd =
Q¯ + L and ρεi,εj = 1 for any i, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Also, from Inequality (3.19),
we learn that Theorem 3.3 holds for all correlation coefficients ρεi,εj ∈ [−1, 1],
where i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. That is, even if all random variables, εi, are not positively
correlated, Theorem 3.3 is still true.
Next, we consider other factors that affect the variance of CP.
Theorem 3.4. For Qd ∈ I2 and ρεiεj ∈ [0, 1], V ar(Pˆ cs ) is a decreasing function of
L and independent of P¯ . Moreover, for Qd ∈ I3, V ar(Pˆ cs ) is independent of L and
P¯ .
Proof. Similar to Theorem 3.2.
3.3 Analytical model 2
Since gencos make offers according to their production costs, more expensive gen-
eration units are being dispatched as demand is high. It is reasonable to assume
that the uncertainty of offered price is associated with its price. In this section, we
examine a case where the uncertainty of supply is a multiplied factor instead of an
added factor, which is assumed in the Analytical model 1.
3.3.1 Assumptions
We modify the Assumptions 3-1 and 3-3 as the following.
Assumption 3-1′. Supply is a discrete function of uncertainty.
By reordering m offers with prices, the supply function is
F (x) = P si (1 + εi), for x ∈ ai, (3.21)




i ] is the quantity interval that gencos are willing to supply




2 < · · · < P sm from the law of
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supply. Also, εi are identically distributed random variables with V ar(εi) = σ
2,
for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Since most of the generating units in Singapore rely on fuel oil and natural gas,
the uncertainties may be highly correlated. We assume that εi, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
are independent or pairwise positively correlated. That is, ρεi,εj ∈ [0, 1], where
ρεi,εj is the correlation coefficient of εi and εj, for i, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Assumption 3-3′. With given hedge price and hedge quantity, the genco
neutralizes R in interval I2.
We assume that the adjusted supply function is parallel to the original supply
function in I2 and unchanged in I3. With given hedge price and hedge quantity,
we define the adjusted supply function as
f(x) =

P¯ , for x ∈ I1,
fI2(x), for x ∈ I2,





i (1 + εi) + h, for x ∈ ai ∩ I2, (3.23)
fI3(x) = F (x) = P
s
i (1 + εi), for x ∈ ai ∩ I3. (3.24)
The constant h = −R/L is the shifting of offer prices in I2 in order to neutralize
revenue.
3.3.2 MCP without hedge price and hedge quantity
From Assumption 3-2, MCQ is equal to Qd and Qd ∈ ak1 . Thus, the MCP is equal
to Ps = F (Qd) = P
s
k1
(1 + εk1) when no hedge price and hedge quantity are given.
Consequently, the variance of MCP without hedge price and hedge quantity is
V ar(Ps) = V ar(P
s
k1
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3.3.3 MCP with hedge price and hedge quantity
In this section, we show that the hedge quantity increases the volatility of MCP.
We first examine the adjusted supply function when the hedge price, P¯ , and hedge
quantity, Q¯, are given. From Equation (3.22), the adjusted supply function, f(x),
is decided by hedge price, P¯ , and hedge quantity, Q¯, in interval I1. In interval I2,
f(x) = fI2(x) = P
s
i (1 + εi) + h.
In order to find the adjusted supply function in I2, we first examine h. From
Assumption 3-3′,
h = −R/L






















f(x) = fI3(x) = P
s
i (1 + εi).
The MCP is equal to Pˆs = f(Qd) when hedge price and hedge quantity are
given. From Assumption 3-2, Qd ∈ (Q¯, Qˆ]. We consider two cases: Qd ∈ I2 and
Qd ∈ I3.
Case 1. Qd ∈ I2.
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Consequently, the variance of MCP with hedge price and hedge quantity is

























































where Equation (3.28) holds because εi are identically distributed random variables,
for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Case 2. Qd ∈ I3.




(1 + εk1). (3.29)
Thus, the variance of MCP with hedge price and hedge quantity is
V ar(fI3(Qd)) = V ar(P
s
k1




We now show that the variance of MCP does not decrease for ρεiεj ∈ [0, 1] when
the hedge quantity is introduced.
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Theorem 3.5. For ρεiεj ∈ [0, 1], we have V ar(Pˆs) ≥ V ar(Ps).
Proof. From Assumption 3-2, Qd ∈ (Q¯, Qˆ]. There are two cases: Qd ∈ I2 and
Qd ∈ I3.
Case 1. Qd ∈ I2.



























































+(Q¯−Qsk0−1)2P sk02 > 0 because Q¯ > Qsk0−1.
Case 2. Qd ∈ I3.
We have
V ar(fI3(Qd)) = P
s
k1
2σ2 = V ar(Ps), (3.32)
where Equation (3.32) holds from Equations (3.25) and (3.30).
From cases 1 and 2, Pˆs = f(Qd), we have V ar(Pˆs) ≥ V ar(Ps).
Next, we show other factors that affect the variance of the MCP.
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Theorem 3.6. For Qd ∈ I2 and ρεiεj ∈ [0, 1], V ar(Pˆs) is a decreasing function of
L, an increasing function of Q¯. For Qd ∈ I2, V ar(Pˆs) is also independent of P¯ .
Moreover, for Qd ∈ I3, V ar(Pˆs) is independent of L, Q¯ and P¯ .
Proof. Similar to Theorem 3.2.
3.3.4 CP
When no hedge price and hedge quantity are given, customers buy all electricity
from the wholesale market at MCP. Thus, the CP without hedge price and hedge
quantity is P cs = Ps.
When hedge price and hedge quantity exist, customers pay the hedge price,
P¯ , for the hedge quantity, Q¯. To meet the demand, customers buy the remaining
Qd − Q¯ units of electricity from the wholesale market with MCP, Pˆs. We define
the CP as
Pˆ cs = ωP¯ + (1− ω)Pˆs
=
{
ωP¯ + (1− ω)fI2(Qd), for Qd ∈ I2,
ωP¯ + (1− ω)fI3(Qd), for Qd ∈ I3,
(3.33)
where ω = Q¯/Qd is the hedge ratio and Equation (3.33) holds from Equation (3.22)
for Qd ∈ (Q¯, Qˆ].
We now consider two cases: Qd ∈ I2 and Qd ∈ I3.
Case 1. Qd ∈ I2.
The CP with hedge price and hedge quantity is
Pˆ cs = ωP¯ + (1− ω)
(

















where Equation (3.34) holds from Equations (3.27) and (3.33). Consequently, the
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variance of CP with hedge price and hedge quantity is
V ar(Pˆ cs ) = V ar
[

































































where Equation (3.35) holds because εi are identically distributed random variables,
for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Case 2. Qd ∈ I3.
The CP with hedge price and hedge quantity is
Pˆ cs = ωP¯ + (1− ω)[P sk1(1 + εk1)], (3.36)
where Equation (3.36) holds from Equations (3.29) and (3.33). Thus, the variance
of CP with hedge price and hedge quantity is
V ar(Pˆ cs ) = (1− ω)2P sk12σ2. (3.37)
We now show that the variance of CP does not increase when hedge quantity
is assigned.
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where the inequality holds from Q¯ < Qd ≤ Q¯+ L. Thus,














































































where Inequalities (3.39) and (3.41) hold from P s1 < P
s
2 < · · · < P sm and Inequality
(3.40) holds from Equation (3.38).
Theorem 3.7. V ar(Pˆ cs ) ≤ V ar(P cs ).
Proof. Consider two cases: Qd ∈ I2 and Qd ∈ I3.
Case 1. Qd ∈ I2.
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For ρεiεj = 1, we have










≤ P sk12σ2 (3.42)
= V ar(Ps)
= V ar(P cs ),
where Equation (3.42) holds from Lemma 3.2, Equations (3.25) and (3.35). Since
V ar(Pˆ cs ) is an increasing function of ρεiεj and V ar(Pˆ
c
s ) ≤ V ar(P cs ) for ρεiεj = 1,
we have V ar(Pˆ cs ) ≤ V ar(P cs ) for all possible values of ρεiεj ∈ [−1, 1].
Case 2. Qd ∈ I3.
Since 0 < ω ≤ 1,




= V ar(P cs ),
where the inequality holds from Equations (3.25) and (3.37).
Next, we show other factors that affect the variance of CP.
Theorem 3.8. For Qd ∈ I2 and ρεiεj ∈ [0, 1], V ar(Pˆ cs ) is a decreasing function of
L. For Qd ∈ I2, V ar(Pˆ cs ) is independent of P¯ . Moreover, for Qd ∈ I3, V ar(Pˆ cs ) is
independent of L and P¯ .
Proof. Similar to Theorem 3.2.
3.4 Numerical study
In Singapore, the Uniform Singapore Energy Price (USEP) is the MCP decided
by the electricity wholesale market. In 2004, vesting contracts are introduced in
the Singapore electricity market. They are a kind of bilateral contract, except
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that they are imposed by the Singapore government and are not negotiated. The
two basic elements of vesting contracts are hedge price and hedge quantity. The
percentage of total demand hedged by contracts is the hedge ratio, which is the
hedge quantity divided by demand. The CP is the combination of hedge price and
MCP weighted by the hedge ratio. The data of hedge price, hedge quantity and
hedge ratio can be found in the website of the Market Support Services Licensee.
The data of USEP and demand quantity can be found in the website of Energy
Market Company.
We analyze the data collected from 2003 to 2010. In the Singapore wholesale
market, one trading period is half an hour. From 2003 to 2010, the number of
periods is 140,256. The hedging mechanism was not part of any 2003 market data.
Also, different hedge prices and hedge quantities are assigned from 2004 to 2010.
To avoid irrational prices, we only select these periods with USEP within [0,
S$1000/MWh] for analysis. Irrational prices are usually due to unplanned disrup-
tion of gas. In fact, 99.90% of the total periods has USEPs within the interval [0,
S$1000/MWh]. In Table 3.2, we present the number of selected periods and the
total number of periods. Also, the percentage of selected periods for each year,
which is at least 99.72%, is showed in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: The number of selected periods with USEP in [0, S$1000/MWh]
Year Selected Total Percentage
periods periods (Selected/Total)
2003 17499 17520 99.88%
2004 17550 17568 99.90%
2005 17503 17520 99.90%
2006 17508 17520 99.93%
2007 17508 17520 99.93%
2008 17557 17568 99.94%
2009 17471 17520 99.72%
2010 17517 17520 99.98%
Total 140113 140256 99.90%
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Table 3.3: Mean and sample variance of USEP for different de-
mand intervals (Based on percentiles of demand)
Year Demand interval Mean of USEP Sample variance of USEP
2003 [2535, 3158] 70 205
(3158, 3305] 77 544
(3305, 3462] 80 89
(3462, 3608] 84 363
(3608, 3793] 86 262
(3793, 4082] 89 477
(4082, 4288] 93 402
(4288, 4529] 97 551
(4529, 4644] 107 912
(4644, 4999] 117 1385
2004 [2691, 3308] 67 99
(3308, 3473] 74 94
(3473, 3637] 78 413
(3637, 3784] 83 1427
(3784, 3972] 81 572
(3972, 4245] 81 134
(4245, 4470] 83 379
(4470, 4682] 82 230
(4682, 4816] 87 1409
(4816, 5091] 92 945
2005 [2879, 3496] 84 230
(3496, 3640] 96 288
(3640, 3799] 109 1697
(3799, 3953] 110 2747
(3953, 4146] 106 1273
(4146, 4400] 108 1292
(4400, 4648] 113 2962
(4648, 4868] 107 2668
(4868, 5027] 111 1477
(5027, 5359] 135 6839
2006 [3021, 3600] 105 256
(3600, 3753] 115 647
(3753, 3920] 124 877
(3920, 4091] 129 2164
(4091, 4279] 130 2913
(4279, 4556] 135 5051
(4556, 4815] 147 7525
(4815, 5030] 130 2919
(5030, 5203] 137 2689
(5203, 5452] 153 4769
2007 [3208, 3754] 104 307
(3754, 3919] 111 217
(3919, 4108] 116 471
(4108, 4292] 122 1713
(4292, 4487] 124 1774
(4487, 4763] 131 4893
(4763, 5024] 126 945
(5024, 5223] 125 763
(5223, 5375] 130 619
(5375, 5782] 140 3041
2008 [3082, 3753] 118 2009
(3753, 3941] 151 2032
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 3.3: Mean and sample variance of USEP for different demand
intervals (Based on percentiles of demand) – Continued
Year Demand interval Mean of USEP Sample variance of USEP
(3941, 4130] 156 1534
(4130, 4323] 160 1997
(4323, 4531] 163 1997
(4531, 4801] 164 3098
(4801, 5084] 168 4689
(5084, 5280] 161 2997
(5280, 5466] 176 2456
(5466, 5949] 201 3453
2009 [3053, 3758] 82 609
(3758, 3956] 114 796
(3956, 4139] 123 1724
(4139, 4345] 132 2836
(4345, 4556] 140 4405
(4556, 4805] 140 5854
(4805, 5093] 139 4982
(5093, 5289] 141 5139
(5289, 5528] 180 10149
(5528, 5876] 239 15351
2010 [3577, 4154] 132 172
(4154, 4327] 142 559
(4327, 4541] 155 1463
(4541, 4754] 155 1260
(4754, 4961] 160 1729
(4961, 5231] 172 3462
(5231, 5506] 172 2644
(5506, 5721] 180 4120
(5721, 5899] 196 5831
(5899, 6294] 232 12496
Table 3.4: Correlation coefficient between sample variance and square of mean of
USEP for selected periods (Based on percentiles of demand)
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Correlation coefficient 0.90 0.65 0.93 0.86 0.67 0.48 0.97 0.98
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Table 3.5: Mean and sample variance of USEP for different de-
mand intervals (Based on the same length of demand range)
Year Demand interval Mean of USEP Sample variance of USEP
2003 [2535, 2781] 60 552
(2781, 3027] 67 177
(3027, 3274] 75 445
(3274, 3520] 80 94
(3520, 3767] 85 369
(3767, 4013] 88 455
(4013, 4260] 92 353
(4260, 4506] 97 617
(4506, 4752] 110 1102
(4752, 4999] 118 1247
2004 [2691, 2931] 45 628
(2931, 3171] 64 79
(3171, 3411] 71 66
(3411, 3651] 78 470
(3651, 3891] 82 871
(3891, 4131] 82 513
(4131, 4371] 82 334
(4371, 4611] 83 288
(4611, 4851] 86 1042
(4851, 5091] 93 994
2005 [2879, 3127] 67 147
(3127, 3375] 80 188
(3375, 3623] 94 252
(3623, 3871] 108 1470
(3871, 4119] 108 2343
(4119, 4467] 108 1226
(4367, 4615] 113 2781
(4615, 4863] 107 2764
(4863, 5111] 114 2225
(5111, 5359] 155 10594
2006 [3021, 3264] 100 67
(3264, 3507] 103 266
(3507, 3750] 113 540
(3750, 3993] 126 1273
(3993, 4236] 130 2667
(4236, 4479] 134 5099
(4479, 4722] 142 4843
(4722, 4966] 139 6197
(4966, 5209] 135 2343
(5209, 5452] 153 4780
2007 [3208, 3465] 90 59
(3465, 3723] 105 317
(3723, 3980] 111 242
(3980, 4237] 120 1085
(4237, 4495] 124 1785
(4495, 4752] 132 5158
(4752, 5010] 126 1027
(5010, 5267] 126 740
(5267, 5525] 132 1242
(5525, 5782] 155 6378
2008 [3082, 3368] 61 680
(3368, 3655] 107 1660
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 3.5: Mean and sample variance of USEP for different demand
intervals (Based on the same length of demand range)– Continued
Year Demand interval Mean of USEP Sample variance of USEP
(3655, 3942] 147 1957
(3942, 4229] 157 1626
(4229, 4515] 163 1962
(4515, 4802] 165 3025
(4802, 5089] 168 4670
(5089, 5375] 162 2631
(5375, 5662] 192 2750
(5662, 5949] 225 7557
2009 [3053, 3335] 62 160
(3335, 3617] 73 302
(3617, 3900] 107 688
(3900, 4182] 123 1632
(4182, 4465] 135 3520
(4465, 4747] 141 5505
(4747, 5029] 139 4884
(5029, 5312] 143 5383
(5312, 5594] 185 9362
(5594, 5876] 263 18431
2010 [3577, 3849] 133 44
(3849, 4121] 132 168
(4121, 4392] 143 585
(4392, 4664] 157 1543
(4664, 4936] 157 1373
(4936, 5207] 171 3563
(5207, 5479] 177 2897
(5479, 5751] 179 3663
(5751, 6022] 211 9163
(5022, 6294] 244 12402
Table 3.6: Correlation coefficient between sample variance and square of mean of
USEP for selected periods (Based on the same length of demand range)
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Correlation coefficient 0.81 0.46 0.95 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.99 0.99
In this section, we first investigate the Singapore electricity market to see
whether it follows analytical model 1 or analytical model 2, that is, whether un-
certainty of supply is an additive or multiplicative factor. Secondly, we estimate
USEP for certain selected demand intervals. Finally, we verify the main results in
this chapter, that is, we test if the coefficient of variation of CP is reduced with




3.4.1 Uncertainty is an additive or multiplicative factor
In this part, we examine the data to see if the sample variance of USEP follows
the assumption of analytical model 1 or analytical model 2. From Assumption 3-1,
the supply function in analytical model 1 is
F (x) = P si + εi, for x ∈ ai,
From the above equation, the variance of MCP is σ2. From Assumption 3-1′, the
supply function in analytical model 2 is
F (x) = P si (1 + εi), for x ∈ ai,
From the above equation, the variance of MCP is P si
2σ2, for x ∈ ai.
We now test sample variance of USEP to see whether it follows analytical
model 1 or analytical model 2. We partition the selected data of each year into 10
groups of equal size according to percentiles of demand. The mean of USEP and
sample variance of USEP for each demand interval are presented in Table 3.3. The
correlation coefficient between sample variance and square of mean of USEP for
each year is presented in Table 3.4. We observe that correlation coefficients for all
8 years are positive. Moreover, the correlation coefficients for 5 years are greater
than 0.8.
To further example the impact of the length of demand range. We partition the
selected data of each year into 10 equal size groups according to length of demand.
The mean of USEP and sample variance of USEP for each demand interval are
presented in Table 3.5. The correlation coefficient between sample variance and
square of mean of USEP for each year is presented in Table 3.6. We observe
that correlation coefficients for all 8 years are positive. Moreover, the correlation
coefficients for 7 years are greater than 0.8. Hence, sample variance of USEP has
highly positive correlation with square of mean of USEP. As a result, there is strong
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evidence to suggest that uncertainty is a multiplicative factor. That is, analytical
model 2 should be applied to the Singapore electricity market.
Table 3.7: Minimum and maximum demands for selected periods
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Minimum demand (MW) 2535 2691 2879 3021 3208 3082 3053 3577
Maximum demand (MW) 4999 5091 5359 5452 5782 5949 5876 6294
Table 3.8: Estimated USEP of selected demand intervals









3.4.2 Estimation of USEP for certain selected demand in-
tervals
In this part, we estimate USEPs for certain selected demand intervals. In Table
3.7, we present the minimum and maximum demands of selected periods from
2003 to 2010. The minimum and maximum demands of all years are 2535MW
and 6294MW, respectively. Thus, we choose the demand range [2500, 6500] and
partition it into 8 intervals. The demand intervals selected are [2500, 3000], (3000,
3500], (3500, 4000], (4000, 4500], (4500, 5000], (5000, 5500], (5500, 6000] and (6000,
6500].
The selected data of each year are partitioned into 10 groups of equal size
based on percentiles of demand. In the second and third columns of Table 3.3,
the mean of USEP for each demand interval is presented. They are also shown in
Figure 3.2. From these two columns, we now estimate the USEPs for 8 selected
demand intervals: [2500, 3000], (3000, 3500], (3500, 4000], (4000, 4500], (4500,
5000], (5000, 5500], (5500, 6000] and (6000, 6500]. The estimated USEP for each
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selected demand interval is the average of all possible means of USEPs in that
interval. They are listed in Table 3.8 and shown in Figure 3.3. We observe that
the USEP increases as the demand increases.
Figure 3.2: Mean of USEP for demand intervals
Figure 3.3: Estimated USEP for selected demand intervals
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Table 3.9: Coefficient of variation of customer price (CP) for selected periods
Year Quarter Hedge Hedge Coefficient of
price ratio variation of
($/MWh) CP
2003 Q1 94.24 0.00 0.28
Q2 96.25 0.00 0.21
Q3 95.73 0.00 0.24
Q4 101.56 0.00 0.39
2004 Q1 94.24 0.65 0.05
Q2 96.25 0.65 0.07
Q3 95.73 0.65 0.04
Q4 101.56 0.65 0.15
2005 Q1 101.29 0.65 0.05
Q2 96.35 0.65 0.07
Q3 117.38 0.65 0.04
Q4 128.39 0.65 0.15
2006 Q1 140.70 0.65 0.09
Q2 139.44 0.65 0.14
Q3 147.90 0.65 0.17
Q4 150.20 0.65 0.14
2007 Q1 134.66 0.65 0.18
Q2 121.14 0.65 0.08
Q3 137.25 0.55 0.10
Q4 150.04 0.55 0.05
2008 Q1 161.80 0.55 0.13
Q2 174.44 0.55 0.13
Q3 183.25 0.55 0.07
Q4 238.64 0.55 0.14
2009 Q1 167.14 0.55 0.15
Q2 115.26 0.55 0.33
Q3 138.92 0.55 0.19
Q4 161.70 0.55 0.18
2010 Q1 171.05 0.55 0.21
Q2 176.10 0.55 0.13
Q3 176.29 0.55 0.09
Q4 165.71 0.55 0.15
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Table 3.10: Mean of coefficients of variations of customer price (CP) for different
hedge ratios
Hedge ratio 0 55% 65%
Mean of coefficients of variations of CP 0.28 0.15 0.10
3.4.3 Coefficient of variation of CP and hedge ratio
The coefficients of variations of CP in different quarters are presented in Table 3.9.
The means for coefficients of variations of CP in different quarters are presented
in Table 3.10. From Table 3.10, the mean for coefficients of variations of CP with
no hedge is 0.28. Moreover, the means for coefficients of variations of CP with
55% and 65% hedge ratios are 0.15 and 0.10, respectively. Hence, the coefficient
of variation of CP is reduced with hedge. This result supports Theorems 3.3 and
3.7.
To further verify Theorems 3.3 and 3.7, we conduct two tests: Test 3.1 and
Test 3.2. In Test 3.1, we verify the relationship between coefficients of variations
of CP with no hedge ratio and with 65% hedge ratio. In Test 3.2, we verify the
relationship between coefficients of variations of CP with no hedge ratio and with
55% hedge ratio.
Test 3.1: Coefficient of variation of CP with 65% hedge ratio is less than coef-
ficient of variation of CP with no hedge
There is no hedge in 2003. The quarterly coefficients of variations of USEP for
2003 are presented in Table 3.9. From 2004 to Quarter 2, 2007, the hedge ratio is
65%. Also, the quarterly coefficients of variations of USEP from 2004 to Quarter
2, 2007 are presented in Table 3.9.
Now, we test if the coefficient of variation of CP with 65% hedge ratio is less
than the coefficient of variation of CP with no hedge. The null hypothesis H0 is
that the mean for coefficients of variations of CP with 65% hedge ratio is equal to
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the mean for coefficients of variations of CP with no hedge. That is
H0 : X¯H = X¯,
H1 : X¯H < X¯,
where X¯ is the mean for coefficients of variations of CP with no hedge and X¯H is
the mean for coefficients of variations of CP with 65% hedge ratio.
In this test, we set the significance level at 0.05. The probability of Type I error
is 0.02, which is less than the significance level. Thus, we reject H0. Statistically,
mean for coefficients of variations of CP with 65% hedge ratio is significantly less
than mean for coefficients of variations of CP with no hedge. This result supports
Theorems 3.3 and 3.7.
Test 3.2: Coefficient of variation of CP with 55% hedge ratio is less than coef-
ficient of variation of CP with no hedge
There is no hedge in 2003. The quarterly coefficients of variation of USEP for
2003 are presented in Table 3.9. From Quarter 3, 2007 to 2010, the hedge ratio is
55%. Also, the quarterly coefficients of variation of USEP from Quarter 3, 2007 to
2010 are presented in Table 3.9.
Now, we test if the coefficient of variation of CP with 55% hedge ratio is less
than the coefficient of variation of CP with no hedge. The null hypothesis H0 is
that the mean for coefficients of variations of CP with 55% hedge ratio is equal to
the mean for coefficients of variations of CP with no hedge. That is
H0 : X¯L = X¯,
H1 : X¯L < X¯,
where X¯ is the mean for coefficients of variations of CP with no hedge and X¯L is
the mean for coefficients of variations of CP with 55% hedge ratio.
In this test, we set the significance level at 0.05. The probability of Type I error
is 0.01, which is less than the significance level. Thus, we reject H0. Statistically,
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the mean for coefficients of variations of CP with 55% hedge ratio is significantly
less than the mean for coefficients of variations of CP with no hedge. This result
supports Theorems 3.3 and 3.7.
3.4.4 Coefficient of variation of CP and hedge price
The coefficients of variations of CP and hedge price in different quarters are pre-
sented in Table 3.9. We now exam the relationship between coefficient of variation
of CP and hedge price. The correlation coefficient between coefficient of variation
of CP and hedge price is -0.11. This result supports Theorems 3.4 and 3.8.
3.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we consider an unstable environment and assume that supply is a
discrete function. To study the impact of a hedge, we build mathematical models
and analyze how the hedge price and quantity affect the uncertainties of MCP and
CP.
There are four major analytical results from our models. Firstly, we find that
the variance of MCP increases when the hedge quantity is assigned. That is because
the uncertainty (risk) of supplying an amount of electricity equal to hedge quantity
is shifted to the estimated demand beyond the hedge quantity. Also, the variance
of CP decreases when the hedge quantity is assigned.
Secondly, we find that the variances of MCP and CP do not have statistically
significant relationships with the hedge price. That is, the variances of MCP and
CP are affected by the uncertainty of profit R and the quantity L after neutraliza-
tion. Also, the uncertainty of R is caused by the supply function. Thus, the hedge
price may affect only the total amount of R, and not its variance.
Thirdly, we find that the variances of MCP and CP are decreasing functions of
neutralizing quantity L. That is because a larger L can help to share the uncer-
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tainty for supplying the hedge quantity.
Fourthly, we find that the variance of MCP is an increasing function of hedge
quantity Q¯. That is because large Q¯ results in large uncertainty being shifted to
the neutralized interval I2.
A numerical study is conducted using data from the Singapore electricity market
from 2003 to 2010 to verify our model assumptions and the main results. The data






Since the 1980s, the electricity industries in many countries have been deregulated,
for instance, in United States, Australia, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Norway
and Spain (Joskow, 2008). As a result of deregulation, the electricity spot markets
are introduced. There are three participants in the electricity spot markets: suppli-
ers, customers and ISO. Usually, the suppliers are gencos who bid to sell electricity
to customers. Then, the ISO collects information from both supply and demand
sides and dispatches electricity for each period. This market mechanism may result
in an undesirable outcome, the volatility of electricity prices.
To reduce the high volatility of electricity prices, vesting and forward contracts
are introduced into the spot markets. Before submitting bids in the spot market,
gencos and customers may sign contracts on dispatching an amount of electric-
ity (contract quantity) at a fixed price (contract price). The bilateral contracts
are independent from the market dispatching mechanism. They are just financial
instruments without any actual transfer of electricity.
In this chapter, we consider two different models, SFE and Cournot, to study
the interactions between bilateral contracts and competition behaviors of gencos
in the spot market. The SFE model was first proposed by Klemperer and Meyer
(1989). In the SFE model, each genco determines its own supply function and its
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goal is to maximize individual profit.
Linear and symmetric SFE models are both popular SFE models. In the linear
SFE models, each genco determines a linear supply function. For the symmetric
SFE models, all gencos have the same cost function. With demand uncertainty,
Klemperer and Meyer (1989) assumed that symmetric gencos submit general supply
functions and proved the existence of SFE. They also gave sufficient conditions for
the uniqueness of SFE. Baldick et al. (2004) presented a linear SFE model and
applied it to the United Kingdom electricity market. Rudkevich (2005) proved the
existence and uniqueness of SFE in linear models. Moreover, many researchers
examine the effects of bilateral contracts on SFE. For example, Niu et al. (2005)
proposed a linear asymmetric SFE model with transmission constraints to study
the behaviors of gencos with bilateral contracts.
Another popular model is the Cournot model. The Cournot model is a well
known oligopoly model studied by many researchers. In the Cournot model, gen-
cos determine only the quantities that they are willing to supply. Willems (2002)
studied two-genco Cournot models without bilateral contracts. With bilateral con-
tracts, Allaz and Vila (1993) presented a two-genco Cournot model to investigate
the impact of bilateral contracts on the market prices. Bushnell (2007) generalized
this model with multiple gencos.
The remaining parts of this chapter are organized as follows. In Section 4.2,
we present two models, SFE and Cournot, to investigate the impact of bilateral
contracts on the variances of MCP and CP. In Section 4.3, a numerical study based
on Singapore electricity market is conducted to verify our models. Conclusions are
presented in Section 4.4.
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4.2 The SFE and Cournot models
In this section, we consider a spot market where n gencos are in competition to
supply electricity and bilateral contracts are signed outside the market. A part of
demand is satisfied in the bilateral contracts and the other part is satisfied in the
spot market.
We present two models, SFE and Cournot, to investigate the impact of bilateral
contracts on the variances of MCP and CP in the spot market. In the SFE model,
each genco determines its own supply function. However, in the Cournot model,
each genco only determines the quantity it is willing to supply. In both models,
the goal of each genco is to maximize its own profit in the spot market. We assume
that market demand function is linear with uncertainty in both models. Also, we
assume that the production cost is quadratic and marginal cost is linear.
4.2.1 Notations
The following notations are used in this chapter.
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Table 4.1: Notations used in the SFE and Cournot models
n = Number of generation companies (gencos)
i = Genco i, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
xi = Electricity quantity produced by genco i, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
where xi ≥ 0
x = Total electricity quantity produced, where x =
∑n
i=1 xi
PC(xi) = Production cost function for genco i, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
MC(xi) = Marginal cost function for genco i, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
p = Trading price, where p ≥ 0
Q(p) = Demand function
Si(p) = Supply function for genco i, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where Si(p) ≥ 0




P¯ = Contract price, where P¯ ≥ 0
Q¯i = Contract quantity for genco i, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
where 0 < Q¯i ≤ Si(p)
Q¯ = Total contract quantity, where Q¯ =
∑n
i=1 Q¯i
Qˆs = Market clearing quantity with contracts, where Qˆs ≥ Q¯ ≥ 0
ω = Hedge ratio, where ω ∈ (0, 1]
= Q¯/Qˆs
Pˆs = Market clearing price with contracts, where Pˆs ≥ 0
Pˆ cs = Customer price with contracts, where Pˆ
c
s ≥ 0
= ωP¯ + (1− ω)Pˆs
pˆiis = Profit of genco i from the spot market with contracts signed,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
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4.2.2 Assumptions
To simplify our model, we make two assumptions as follows. These two assumptions
can be seen in Green (1999) and Rudkevich (2005).
Assumption 4-1. Demand function is linear with uncertainty.
We assume that the demand function is Q(p) = a− bp, where a and b > 0, are
independent random variables.
Assumption 4-2. Production cost of each genco is a quadratic function of
quantity produced.
We assume all gencos have the same cost and the production cost of genco i is
PC(xi) = Kcx
2
i + c1, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where c > 0. Without loss of generality,
we let K = 0.5 to have marginal cost as MC(xi) = cxi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
4.2.3 The SFE model
In the SFE model, each genco determines a supply function to maximize its own
profit in the spot market. We assume that the linear supply function of genco i is
Si(p) = αi +βip, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where αi and βi are given constants. Note that
αi and βi > 0, are the intercept and slope of the supply function, respectively. For
genco i that has a contract quantity, Q¯i, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, its profit from the spot
market is
pˆiis = p[(a− bp− S−i(p))− Q¯i]− PC(a− bp− S−i(p)),
where p[(a − bp − S−i(p)) − Q¯i] is the revenue from the spot market and PC(a −
bp− S−i(p)) is the cost.
Consider that all gencos have linear supply functions. The equilibrium price in










j 6=i βj =
∑n
j=1 βj − βi. The equilibrium is described by the following
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∂{p[(a− bp− S−i(p))− Q¯i]− PC(a− bp− S−i(p))}
∂p



















= αi + βip− Q¯i + c(b+
∑
j 6=i




= −Q¯i + [1 + c(b+
∑
j 6=i















where Equation (4.2) holds from Si(p) = αi + βip and PC(xi) = 0.5cx
2
i + c1. For
i = 1, 2, . . . , n, we have






βj) + [1 + c(b+
∑
j 6=i
βj)]βi}p = 0. (4.3)
Note that Equation (4.3) represents n equations. The above n equations can only















From Equations (4.4) and (4.5), we can see that the values of αi and βi have no
relationship with a.
From Equation (4.5), the bids of gencos are dependent on the value of b. For
various possible value of b, the bids are different.
We now show that all gencos’ supply functions have the same slope.
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Lemma 4.1. β1 = β2 = · · · = βn = β.
Proof. From b and βi > 0, we have 1 + cβi(b +
∑
j 6=i βj) > 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
















From Equations (4.6) and (4.7), we have













Then, we can simplify it as






βj = βk − βh.
As a result,




From b, c and βi > 0, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, we have βh = βk for any genco h and k.
Hence, β1 = β2 = · · · = βn = β.













a{1 + c[b+ (n− 1)β]} − Q¯
(b+ nβ){1 + c[b+ (n− 1)β]} (4.9)
= λa− λµQ¯,
where Equation (4.8) holds from Equation (4.4) and Lemma 4.1. Consequently,
the variance of MCP is
V ar(Pˆs) = E[(Pˆs − E[Pˆs])2] = E[(λa− λµQ¯− E[λa− λµQ¯])2].
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∂E[(λa− λµQ¯− E[λa− λµQ¯])2]
∂Q¯
= E[2(λa− λµQ¯− E[λa− λµQ¯]) · (−λµ+ E[λµ])]
= 2E[(λa− λµQ¯− E[λa− λµQ¯]) · (−λµ)
+(λa− λµQ¯− E[λa− λµQ¯]) · E[λµ]]
= 2E[(λa− λµQ¯) · (−λµ)− E[λa− λµQ¯] · (−λµ)
+(λa− λµQ¯) · E[λµ]− E[λa− λµQ¯] · E[λµ]]
= 2E[(λa− λµQ¯) · (−λµ) + (λa− λµQ¯) · E[λµ]]
= 2E[(λa− λµQ¯) · (−λµ+ E[λµ])]
= 2E[Pˆs(−λµ+ E[λµ])]. (4.10)
We now show the relationship between slope of supply function and slope of
demand function.
Lemma 4.2. β is an increasing function of b.











1 + c[b+ (n− 1)β] .
Then,
c(n− 1)β2 + (bc+ 2− n)β − b = 0. (4.11)
Solving the above equation, we get two solutions. Since we assume that β > 0, the
negative solution of Equation (4.11) is infeasible. Hence, we have








c(n− 1) . (4.12)
Now, we show that bc + 2 − n + n − 1 = bc + 1 > bc. When both sides are







c(n− 1) . (4.13)
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c(n− 1) , (4.14)
where Equation (4.14) holds from Equation (4.13). The first partial derivative of































where the first equation holds from Equation (4.12) and the inequality holds from
Equation (4.14). Hence, β is an increasing function of b.
We now show the relationship between intercept of supply function and slope
of demand function.
Lemma 4.3. αi is a decreasing function of b, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
























where the first equation holds from Equation (4.4) and the inequality holds from
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Lemma 4.2.
Now, we show the monotonic property of λ and µ over the slope of demand
function.
Lemma 4.4. λ, µ are decreasing functions of b.
Proof. We have λ = 1/(b + nβ) and µ = 1/{1 + c[b + (n − 1)β]}. From Lemma
4.2, we know that β is an increasing function of b. Hence, λ and µ are decreasing
functions of b.
We now show the relationship between MCP and slope of demand function.
Lemma 4.5. For Q¯→ 0+, we have Pˆs is a decreasing function of b.







a{1 + c[b+ (n− 1)β]} − Q¯






a− Q¯+ ac[b+ (n− 1)β]









1 + (n− 1)∂β
∂b
)
(b+ nβ){1 + c[b+ (n− 1)β]}
−{a− Q¯+ ac[b+ (n− 1)β]}(b+ nβ)c
(
1 + (n− 1)∂β
∂b
)















1 + (n− 1)∂β
∂b
)






{1 + c[b+ (n− 1)β]}
]
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=
1



























































{1 + c[b+ (n− 1)β]}
]
< 0,
where the first equation holds from Equation (4.9) and the inequality holds from
b > 0, β > 0 and Lemma 4.2.
Next, we show that the variance of MCP is a decreasing function of contract
quantity under two extreme conditions.
Theorem 4.1. For Q¯→ 0+, V ar(Pˆs) is a decreasing function of Q¯.














where the first equation holds from Equation (4.10) and the second equation holds
from Assumption 4-1 that a and b are random variables. Moreover, the Inequality
(4.16) holds from Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5. From Lemma 4.4, λ and µ are decreasing
functions of b. From Lemma 4.5, for Q¯ → 0+, Pˆs is a decreasing function of b.
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Hence, by the Chebyshev integral inequality, Inequality (4.16) holds. As a result,
for Q¯→ 0+, the variance of MCP is a decreasing function of contract quantity.
Now, we show that the variance of CP is a decreasing function of contract
quantity under two extreme conditions.
Theorem 4.2. For Q¯→ 0+, V ar(Pˆ cs ) is a decreasing function of contract quantity,
Q¯.
Proof. From Theorem 4.1, for Q¯→ 0+, we have the variance of MCP, V ar(Pˆs) is
a decreasing function of Q¯. Since
V ar(Pˆ cs ) = V ar
(
ωP¯ + (1− ω)Pˆs
)
= V ar(Pˆs)(1− ω)2,
for Q¯→ 0+, the variance of CP is a decreasing function of contract quantity.
Theorem 4.1 shows that the variance of MCP is decreased with the introduc-
tion of bilateral contracts. Since the hedge price is constant, we know that the
variance of CP is reduced with the introduction of bilateral contracts if hedge ratio
is assumed to be constant.
4.2.4 The Cournot model
We consider a market where n gencos are in competition to supply electricity.
They can only bid the quantities that they are willing to supply. For genco i with












(xi − Q¯i) is the revenue from spot market and PC(xi) is the cost.





a− x− (xi − Q¯i)
b
)
− cxi = 0, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
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j 6=i Q¯j =
∑n
j=1 Q¯j − Q¯i. We show the optimal production quantity for
each individual genco.










n+ 1 + bc
. (4.17)
Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar as Bushnell (2007).
From Lemma 4.6 and Q¯ =
∑n






n+ 1 + bc
, (4.18)











a(n+ 1 + bc)− na− Q¯
b(n+ 1 + bc)
=
a+ abc− Q¯
b(n+ 1 + bc)
=
a− Q¯
b(n+ 1 + bc)
+
abc
b(n+ 1 + bc)
, (4.21)
where Equation (4.19) holds from Assumption 4-1 and Equation (4.20) holds from
Equation (4.18).
Define γ = 1/[b(n+ 1 + bc)]. From Equation (4.21), we have
Pˆs =
a− Q¯
b(n+ 1 + bc)
+
abc
b(n+ 1 + bc)
= (a− Q¯)γ + abcγ.
Consequently, the variance of MCP is
V ar(Pˆs) = E[(Pˆs − E[Pˆs])2] = E[((a− Q¯)γ + abcγ − E[(a− Q¯)γ + abcγ])2].
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The first partial derivative of V ar(Pˆs) with respect to Q¯ is
∂V ar(Pˆs)
∂Q¯
= E[2((a− Q¯)γ + abcγ − E[(a− Q¯)γ + abcγ])(−γ + E[γ])]
= 2E[−(a− Q¯)γ2 − abcγ2 + E[(a− Q¯)γ]γ + E[abcγ]γ
+(a− Q¯)γE[γ] + abcγE[γ]
−E[(a− Q¯)γ]E[γ]− E[abcγ]E[γ]]
= 2E[−(a− Q¯)γ2]− 2E[abcγ2]
+2E[(a− Q¯)γ]E[γ] + 2E[abcγ]E[γ]]
= 2E[(a− Q¯)γ(E[γ]− γ)] + 2E[abcγ(E[γ]− γ)]. (4.22)
We now show that the variance of MCP does not increase when bilateral con-
tracts are signed.
Theorem 4.3. V ar(Pˆs) is a decreasing function of Q¯.
Proof. Under Assumption 4-1, we have
E[(a− Q¯)γ(E[γ]− γ)] = E[(a− Q¯)]E[γ(E[γ]− γ)]
= E[(a− Q¯)]E[γ(E[γ]− γ)− E[γ](E[γ]− γ)]
= E[(a− Q¯)]E[(γ − E[γ])(E[γ]− γ)]
= −E[(a− Q¯)]E[(γ − E[γ])2]
= −E[(a− Q¯)]V ar(γ)
≤ 0, (4.23)
where the second equation holds from E[E[γ]− γ)] = 0.
Under Assumption 4-1, we have













where the inequality holds from the Chebyshev integral inequality since both γ and
bγ are decreasing functions of b.
From Equation (4.22), we have
∂V ar(Pˆs)
∂Q¯
= 2E[(a− Q¯)γ(E[γ]− γ)] + 2E[abcγ(E[γ]− γ)]
≤ 0,
where the inequality holds from Equations (4.23) and (4.24). Hence, the variance
of MCP is a decreasing function of contract quantity.
Now, we show that the variance of CP is a decreasing function of contract
quantity.
Theorem 4.4. V ar(Pˆ cs ) is a decreasing function of Q¯.
Proof. From Theorem 4.3, we have V ar(Pˆs) is a decreasing function of Q¯. Since
V ar(Pˆ cs ) = V ar
(
ωP¯ + (1− ω)Pˆs
)
= V ar(Pˆs)(1− ω)2,
the variance of CP is a decreasing function of contract quantity.
Theorem 4.3 shows that the variance of MCP is decreased with the introduc-
tion of bilateral contracts. Since the hedge price is constant, we know that the
variance of CP is reduced with the introduction of bilateral contracts if hedge ratio
is assumed to be constant.
4.3 Numerical study
In Chapter 3, demand is assumed to be inelastic which is independent of price.
However, demand function is a linear function in Chapter 4. In the Singapore
electricity market, demand quantity is forecasted as a constant value which is
independent of price. It can be interpreted as a special case of a linear demand
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function. In Singapore, gencos make offers to sell electricity in the market. An
offer specifies the price at which an amount of electricity that a genco is willing to
sell (Energy Market Authority (EMA) Singapore, 2010a). The SFE is much closer
to the Singapore market in this aspect.
Continuing from Section 3.4, we now investigate the Singapore electricity mar-
ket to see if it follows the Assumption 4-2 which states that production cost is a
quadratic function of quantity produced. Secondly, we verify the main results in
this chapter, that is, the coefficient of variation of CP is a decreasing function of
hedge ratio. In addition, we discuss the relationship between coefficient of variation
of USEP and hedge price.
Table 4.2: Mean of USEP and mean of demand for different
demand intervals
Year Demand interval Mean of USEP Mean of demand
2003 [2535, 3158] 70 3034
(3158, 3305] 77 3232
(3305, 3462] 80 3385
(3462, 3608] 84 3537
(3608, 3793] 86 3697
(3793, 4082] 89 3925
(4082, 4288] 93 4194
(4288, 4529] 97 4408
(4529, 4644] 107 4591
(4644, 4999] 117 4732
2004 [2691, 3308] 67 3194
(3308, 3473] 74 3391
(3473, 3637] 78 3555
(3637, 3784] 83 3709
(3784, 3972] 81 3874
(3972, 4245] 81 4099
(4245, 4470] 83 4365
(4470, 4682] 82 4577
(4682, 4816] 87 4752
(4816, 5091] 92 4908
2005 [2879, 3496] 84 3345
(3496, 3640] 96 3568
(3640, 3799] 109 3715
(3799, 3953] 110 3877
(3953, 4146] 106 4043
(4146, 4400] 108 4266
(4400, 4648] 113 4537
(4648, 4868] 107 4756
(4868, 5027] 111 4953
(5027, 5359] 135 5110
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 4.2: Mean of USEP and mean of demand for different demand
intervals– Continued
Year Demand interval Mean of USEP Mean of demand
2006 [3021, 3600] 105 3452
(3600, 3753] 115 3679
(3753, 3920] 124 3834
(3920, 4091] 129 4006
(4091, 4279] 130 4178
(4279, 4556] 135 4406
(4556, 4815] 147 4695
(4815, 5030] 130 4921
(5030, 5203] 137 5125
(5203, 5452] 153 5280
2007 [3208, 3754] 104 3617
(3754, 3919] 111 3838
(3919, 4108] 116 4012
(4108, 4292] 122 4203
(4292, 4487] 124 4382
(4487, 4763] 131 4614
(4763, 5024] 126 4901
(5024, 5223] 125 5125
(5223, 5375] 130 5302
(5375, 5782] 140 5478
2008 [3082, 3753] 118 3607
(3753, 3941] 151 3848
(3941, 4130] 156 4030
(4130, 4323] 160 4230
(4323, 4531] 163 4425
(4531, 4801] 164 4658
(4801, 5084] 168 4951
(5084, 5280] 161 5183
(5280, 5466] 176 5378
(5466, 5949] 201 5572
2009 [3053, 3758] 82 3547
(3758, 3956] 114 3865
(3956, 4139] 123 4046
(4139, 4345] 132 4246
(4345, 4556] 140 4449
(4556, 4805] 140 4680
(4805, 5093] 139 4952
(5093, 5289] 141 5191
(5289, 5528] 180 5415
(5528, 5876] 239 5638
2010 [3577, 4154] 132 4022
(4154, 4327] 142 4241
(4327, 4541] 155 4427
(4541, 4754] 155 4652
(4754, 4961] 160 4853
(4961, 5231] 172 5086
(5231, 5506] 176 5380
(5506, 5721] 180 5613
(5721, 5899] 196 5813




From Assumption 4-2, the production cost of each genco is a quadratic function of
quantity produced. The relationship between USEP and demand usually can reflect
the relationship between production cost and demand. To avoid irrational offers,
we only select those periods with USEP within [0, S$1000/MWh] for analysis. The
model used to verify that production cost is a quadratic function is as follows:
USEP = b · (Demand)2.
We partition the selected data of each year into 10 groups of equal size according
to percentiles of demand. The mean of USEP and mean of demand in different
demand intervals are presented in Table 4.2. The regression result of the model
shows that b is 6.17 × 10−6. Its significance level is less than 0.01. Moreover, we
have R2 = 0.96.
To further exam the relationship between price and demand, the original data
from 2003 to 2010 with USEP within [0, S$1000/MWh] is used. The regression
result of the model by using original data shows that b is 6.17×10−6. Its significance
level is less than 0.01. Moreover, we have R2 = 0.84. This is quite close to
results by using the data grouped according to demand level. Hence, the electricity
price is statistically a quadratic function of demand. This result supports that the
production cost could be a quadratic function of demand.
4.3.2 Coefficient of variation of CP and hedge ratio
We now use the data of Singapore electricity market to verify Theorems 4.2 and 4.4
under the environment of linear demand function and quadratic production cost.
From Table 3.10, the mean for coefficients of variations of CP with no hedge is
0.28. Moreover, the means for coefficients of variations of CP with 55% and 65%
hedge ratios are 0.15 and 0.10, respectively. Hence, the coefficient of variation of




To further verify Theorems 4.2 and 4.4, we conduct one test: Test 4.1. In Test
4.1, we verify the relationships between coefficients of variations of CP with 55%
and 65% hedge ratios.
Test 4.1: Coefficient of variation of CP with 65% hedge ratio is less than coef-
ficient of variation of CP with 55% hedge ratio
From 2004 to Quarter 2, 2007, the hedge ratio is 65%. The quarterly coefficients
of variations of USEP from 2004 to Quarter 2, 2007 are presented in Table 3.9. From
Quarter 3, 2007 to 2010, the hedge ratio is 55%. Also, the quarterly coefficients of
variations of USEP from Quarter 3, 2007 to 2010 are presented in Table 3.9.
Now, we test if the coefficient of variation of CP with 65% hedge ratio is less
than the coefficient of variation of CP with 55% hedge ratio. The null hypothesis
H0 is that the mean for coefficients of variations of CP with 65% hedge ratio is
equal to the mean for coefficients of variations of CP with 55% hedge ratio. That
is
H0 : X¯H = X¯L,
H1 : X¯H < X¯L,
where X¯L is the mean for coefficients of variations of CP with 55% hedge ratio and
X¯H is the mean for coefficients of variations of CP with 65% hedge ratio.
In this test, we set the significance level at 0.05. The probability of Type I error
is 0.03, which is less than the significance level. Thus, we reject H0. Statistically,
the mean for coefficients of variations of CP with 65% hedge ratio is significantly less
than the mean for coefficients of variations of CP with 55% hedge ratio. Moreover,
we have the coefficients of variations of CP with 65% and 55% hedge ratios are
significantly less than the coefficient of variation of CP with no hedge from Tests 3.1
and 3.2 in Chapter 3. Hence, we have coefficient of variation of CP is a decreasing
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function of hedge ratio. This result supports Theorems 4.2 and 4.4.
Table 4.3: Coefficient of variation of USEP for selected periods
Year Quarter Hedge Hedge Coefficient of
price ratio variation of
($/MWh) USEP
2003 Q1 94.24 0 0.28
Q2 96.25 0 0.21
Q3 95.73 0 0.24
Q4 101.56 0 0.39
2004 Q1 94.24 0.65 0.11
Q2 96.25 0.65 0.21
Q3 95.73 0.65 0.14
Q4 101.56 0.65 0.46
2005 Q1 101.29 0.65 0.40
Q2 96.35 0.65 0.40
Q3 117.38 0.65 0.48
Q4 128.39 0.65 0.39
2006 Q1 140.7 0.65 0.27
Q2 139.44 0.65 0.43
Q3 147.9 0.65 0.48
Q4 150.2 0.65 0.42
2007 Q1 134.66 0.65 0.54
Q2 121.14 0.65 0.23
Q3 137.25 0.55 0.25
Q4 150.04 0.55 0.10
2008 Q1 161.8 0.55 0.29
Q2 174.44 0.55 0.28
Q3 183.25 0.55 0.16
Q4 238.64 0.55 0.42
2009 Q1 167.14 0.55 0.45
Q2 115.26 0.55 0.64
Q3 138.92 0.55 0.44
Q4 161.7 0.55 0.42
2010 Q1 171.05 0.55 0.49
Q2 176.1 0.55 0.29
Q3 176.29 0.55 0.20
Q4 165.71 0.55 0.35
4.3.3 Coefficient of variation of USEP and hedge ratio
There is no hedge in 2003. From 2004 to Quarter 2, 2007, the hedge ratio is 65%.
From Quarter 3, 2007 to 2010, the hedge ratio is 55%. The quarterly coefficients
of variations of USEP from 2003 to 2010 are presented in Table 4.3. To examine
the variation of USEP with and without hedge, we conduct three tests: Test 4.2,
Test 4.3 and Test 4.4. In Test 4.2, we verify the relationship between coefficients
of variations of USEP with no hedge ratio and with 65% hedge ratio. In Test 4.3,
88
4.3 Numerical study
we verify the relationship between coefficients of variations of USEP with no hedge
ratio and with 55% hedge ratio. In Test 4.4, we verify the relationships between
coefficients of variations of USEP with 55% and 65% hedge ratios.
Test 4.2: Relationship between coefficients of variations of USEP with no hedge
ratio and with 65% hedge ratio
The null hypothesis H0 is that the mean for coefficients of variations of USEP
with 65% hedge ratio is equal to the mean for coefficients of variations of USEP







H 6= X¯U ,
where X¯U is the mean for coefficients of variations of USEP with no hedge and X¯UH
is the mean for coefficients of variations of USEP with 65% hedge ratio.
In this test, we set the significance level at 0.32. The probability of Type I error
is 0.02, which is greater than the significance level. Thus, we can not reject H0.
Consequently, mean for coefficients of variations of USEP with 65% hedge ratio
does not have a statistically significant relationship with mean for coefficients of
variations of USEP with no hedge.
Test 4.3: Relationship between coefficients of variations of USEP with no hedge
ratio and with 55% hedge ratio
The null hypothesis H0 is that the mean for coefficients of variations of USEP
with 55% hedge ratio is equal to the mean for coefficients of variations of USEP







L 6= X¯U ,
where X¯U is the mean for coefficients of variations of USEP with no hedge and X¯UL
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is the mean for coefficients of variations of USEP with 55% hedge ratio.
In this test, we set the significance level at 0.22. The probability of Type I
error is 0.01, which is less than the significance level. Thus, we can not reject H0.
Consequently, mean for coefficients of variations of USEP with 55% hedge ratio
does not have a statistically significant relationship with mean for coefficients of
variations of USEP with no hedge.
Test 4.4: Relationships between coefficients of variations of USEP with 55%
and 65% hedge ratios
The null hypothesis H0 is that the mean for coefficients of variations of USEP
with 65% hedge ratio is equal to the mean for coefficients of variations of USEP








H 6= X¯UL ,
where X¯UL is the mean for coefficients of variations of USEP with 55% hedge ratio
and X¯UH is the mean for coefficients of variations of USEP with 65% hedge ratio.
In this test, we set the significance level at 0.83. The probability of Type I
error is 0.03, which is less than the significance level. Thus, we can not reject H0.
Consequently, mean for coefficients of variations of USEP with 65% hedge ratio
does not have a statistically significant relationship with mean for coefficients of
variations of USEP with 55% hedge ratio. From Test 4.2, Test 4.3 and Test 4.4, we
observe that whether the variation of MCP decreases or increases as hedge quantity
increases is inconclusive.
4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we consider an environment where demand is uncertain. We for-
mulate the spot market as SFE and Cournot models and examine the impact of
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bilateral contracts on the uncertainties of MCP and CP. The results show that
the variances of MCP and CP are decreasing functions of contract quantity in a
competitive market. Even when the market is not competitive, bilateral contracts
can also reduce the variances of MCP and CP if the hedge quantity is within a rea-
sonable range. Also, a numerical study is conducted using data from the Singapore
electricity market from 2003 to 2010 to verify our models.
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Chapter 5
Market Power in the Electricity
Market
5.1 Introduction
The electricity industries have been deregulated since the 1980s in many countries,
such as United Kingdom, Singapore, New Zealand and Spain (Joskow, 2008). One
important part in the deregulation is the introduction of electricity spot market.
The electricity spot market is a real time market where electricity is traded. There
are three participants in the electricity spot market: suppliers, buyers and ISO.
Generally, the suppliers are gencos. The buyers include retailers and real con-
sumers. Retailers buy electricity from the spot market and sell it to real consumers
who do not have economical scale to buy electricity directly from the spot market.
The ISO dispatches electricity for each period in electricity spot markets, such as in
United Kingdom and Singapore. Usually, gencos offer their electricity at different
prices. Then, the ISO collects these offers and the demand from the buyer side.
After that, the ISO dispatches cheap electricity first to meet the demand.
The deregulated electricity markets are expected to be stable and competitive.
However, MCP may be unstable in the deregulated electricity markets due to the
three major contributors. Firstly, the offer behavior of gencos may cause the volatil-
ity of MCP. There are some factors affecting the offer behavior of gencos, such as
the production cost and the bidding strategies of gencos. Among these factors,
the most volatile factor is the production cost. Secondly, the demand behavior of
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buyers may cause the volatility of MCP. The inelasticity and fluctuation of demand
are the two attributes of electricity buyers (Stoft, 2002). Finally, lack of inventory
for electricity also contributes to the volatility of MCP. Since electricity may be too
expensive to store, gencos may raise the price as high as they like when demand is
unexpectedly high.
Apart from the volatility of MCP, another issue of the deregulated electricity
markets is the competitiveness of the markets. The suppliers may have market
power which reduces the market competition. In a perfect competitive market,
each genco bids according to its marginal cost (MC). However, in a monopoly
market or an oligopoly market, gencos adopt bidding strategies to maximize their
profits. This ability of a genco to use bidding strategies is called market power
(Wolak, 2000). The genco with market power is usually called the price maker (De
La Torre et al., 2002). Generally, price makers can have influence on the electricity
prices and earn more profit.
The deregulated electricity markets are expected to be competitive. There are
two reasons. The first reason is that the competition encourages gencos to control
operating costs and improve technologies in the spot markets. Secondly, the benefit
of competition from the deregulated electricity markets can be shared by consumers
(Joskow, 2008). However, market power does exist in some electricity markets. For
example, Woo et al. (2003) examined the market power in the United Kingdom,
Norway, Alberta and California electricity markets. They found that market power
exists in all these four markets. Mount (2001) showed that the gencos with market
power can increase electricity prices. In this case, consumers suffer from high
electricity prices.
The measurement of market power attracts much attention recently. Researchers
propose many indexes to measure market power. There are two types of indexes:
structural indexes and behavioral indexes. The structural indexes show the mea-
surement of market concentration level. Usually, we use the market share propor-
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tions for gencos to generate the structural indexes. The structural indexes include
the CR, HHI, SMA, RSI, MRR and DM (Gan and Bourcier, 2002; Chang, 2007;
Melnik et al., 2008). The behavioral indexes are measurements of market power
which directly use the data of prices and profits. They include Lerner Index and
the variations of Lerner Index (Stoft, 2002; Nanduri and Das, 2007). Recently, the
data of profits is directly used to measure market power. For example, Nanduri
and Das (2007) proposed the RMPI, which uses the data of profits.
Many researchers use structural and behavioral indexes to measure market
power. For example, MRR is used to test the market power in the United Kingdom
electricity market (Gan and Bourcier, 2002). Chang (2007) used CR, HHI, SMA,
RSI and Lerner Index to measure market power in the Singapore electricity mar-
ket. Ciarreta and Esponosa (2009) used the lower bound of Lerner Index to test
if market power exists in the Spain electricity market. Hellmer and Wa˚rell (2009)
used HHI and DM to measure market power in the Nordic electricity market.
The structural indexes use only the data of market shares, while the behavioral
indexes use only the data of the market prices and MCs. Although RMPI directly
considers the data of profits as the measurement of market power, we are interested
in finding the relative increase in profit to measure market power. Since market
power is the ability of a genco to maximize its own profit, we should investigate
profit directly. Therefore, we propose an index using data of profits to measure
market power in this chapter.
In order to control the volatility of MCP and to mitigate market power, vesting
contracts and forward contracts are introduced. These two types of contracts work
similarly in the spot markets. Contract price and contract quantity are the two
basic elements of these contracts. The difference is that the forward contracts are
negotiated while the vesting contracts are not. In this chapter, the bilateral con-
tracts can be either vesting contracts or forward contracts. This is because, before
bidding in the spot markets, gencos may sign one or both types of these contracts.
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No matter what type of contract is signed, it represents an agreement on dispatch-
ing an amount of electricity (contract quantity) at a fixed price (contract price).
Bilateral contract is one method used to control volatility of MCP. Chang and Park
(2007) showed that bilateral contracts may reduce the variance of electricity prices
in Singapore. Moreover, bilateral contracts can also control market power. Kelman
et al. (2001) showed that the introduction of bilateral contracts can reduce market
power, which is measured by the data of market prices.
In this chapter, we consider Cournot models and study the impact of bilateral
contracts on the spot markets. It is well known that Cournot models are studied
by many researchers. Allaz and Vila (1993) presented Cournot models with two
suppliers and investigated the impact of bilateral contracts on the market prices.
Bushnell (2007) extended this model and considered a situation with multiple gen-
cos. Recently, some researchers provide a modern model for both markets: the
spot market and the forward market. Since forward contracts are signed before
the spot market, these two markets are usually modeled as a two stage equilibrium
problem with equilibrium constraints. When signing the forward contracts, each
genco must consider equilibrium constraints from the spot markets (Yao et al.,
2008). Su (2007) showed the existence of solutions for the deterministic two stage
equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. Zhang et al. (2010) proposed a
stochastic equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints where market demand
is uncertain. They discussed the relationship between spot and forward markets.
Now, we introduce the market rules. Firstly, the gencos may sign bilateral
contracts with contract price and contract quantity before the spot market. These
contracts are financial bilateral contracts. A financial bilateral contract considers
the difference between contract and MCP. If MCP is higher than contract price,
consumers get credit from gencos. Otherwise, customers pay the debit to gencos.
As a result, contract quantity is equivalently sold at contract price. Moreover, any
MCQ other than contract quantity is called SMQ, which is sold at MCP. Besides,
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we are also concerned with the price combined by contract price and MCP which is
called CP. It is a trading-quantity weighted price. More details about the market
rules can be found in Niu et al. (2005) and Bushnell (2007).
In this chapter, we study Cournot models to investigate the impact of bilateral
contracts on the spot market. The MCQ, SMQ, MCP, CP, profit of the market
and market power in the spot market are examined closely. The remaining parts
of this chapter are organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we adopt Cournot models
to formulate the spot market with bilateral contracts. We study the MCQ, SMQ,
MCP, CP and profit of the spot market. In Section 5.2, we also study market power
measured by both Lerner Index and Profit Index. Results from these two indexes
are also showed in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, a numerical study is conducted to
verify our models. Conclusions and directions for further research are presented in
Section 5.4.
5.2 The models
In this section, we consider a market with multiple gencos. Gencos can sign bilateral
contracts before the spot market. In the spot market, each genco always tries to
maximize its own profit. We examine the impact of bilateral contracts on the
spot market with Cournot models. We assume that the market demand and the
production cost are linear functions. The assumption of linear demand function
can be found in many works, for example, Bushnell (2007) and Yao et al. (2008).
Moreover, the assumption of production cost can be found in Allaz and Vila (1993)
and Sapio and Wylomanska (2008). Notations used in the spot market without
and with contracts are showed in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.
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Table 5.1: Notations used in the spot market without contracts
n = Number of generation companies (gencos)
xi = Electricity quantity produced by genco i,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where xi ≥ 0
x = Total electricity quantity produced, where x =
∑n
i=1 xi
P (x) = Price that consumers are willing to pay at quantity x
without contracts
Qs = Market clearing quantity without contracts, where Qs ≥ 0
Ps = Market clearing price without contracts, where Ps ≥ 0




piin(xi) = Net profit of genco i when producing electricity quantity xi
without contracts, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where piin(xi) > 0
Table 5.2: Notations used in the spot market with contracts
P¯ = Contract price, where P¯ ≥ 0
Q¯i = Contract quantity for genco i, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where Q¯i > 0
Q¯ = Total contract quantity, where Q¯ =
∑n
i=1 Q¯i > 0
y = Bidding quantity in the spot market with contract quantity Q¯,
where y ≥ 0
= x− Q¯
Pˆ (y) = Price that consumers are willing to pay at bidding quantity y
with contracts
Qˆs = Market clearing quantity with contracts, where Qˆs ≥ Q¯ > 0
ω = Hedge ratio, where ω ∈ (0, 1]
= Q¯/Qˆs
Pˆs = Market clearing price with contracts, where Pˆs ≥ 0
Pˆ cs = Customer price with contracts, where Pˆ
c
s ≥ 0
= ωP¯ + (1− ω)Pˆs
pˆiin(xi) = Net profit of genco i when producing electricity quantity xi




We make the following two assumptions in our model.
Assumption 5-1. Demand function is linear with uncertainty.
Generally, the marginal utility of electricity is decreasing on quantity purchased
(McConnell and Brue, 2008). Thus, price can be considered as a decreasing function
of quantity. We assume that the demand function without contracts is
P (x) = a− bx+ , (5.1)
where a and b > 0 and  is a random variable with V ar() = σ2. Note that a+ > 0.
Otherwise, the price is not larger than 0. In this case, not electricity will be traded.
We assume uncertainty is only in the intercept of the demand function. However,
we assume that uncertainty is in both the intercept and slope of the demand in
Chapter 4.
With contracts, an amount of electricity equal to contract quantity, Q¯, is sat-
isfied by contracts. Without loss of generality, we have the demand function with
contracts as
Pˆ (y) = P (y + Q¯)
= a− b(y + Q¯) + 
= a− by + − bQ¯. (5.2)
From the definition of Pˆ (y), we have
Pˆ (x− Q¯) = P (x). (5.3)
From Equation (5.3), we know that the model where demand function is changed
is the same as the model where demand function is unchanged. Therefore, the as-
sumption that demand function is unchanged with the introduction of bilateral
contracts is justified.




We assume that the production cost of genco i is cixi, where ci is the marginal
cost of genco i, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Without loss of generality, we assume 0 ≤ ci ≤
ci+1, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. From microeconomics, we have the trading quantity
only if ci ≤ P (x). If ci > a+ − b, then
a+ − b < ci ≤ P (x) = a+ − bx.
From the above inequality, we have x < 1. This implies no meaningful trading
quantity. As a result, we always assume ci ≤ a+ − b. Moreover, we assume that
limn→∞ cn = c¯.
5.2.2 Electricity market without bilateral contracts
We consider an electricity market with n gencos and no bilateral contracts are
allowed in this section. Without contracts, the profit of genco i, is












where P (x) ·xi is the revenue and cixi is the production cost. Equation (5.4) holds
from Equation (5.1).
Without contracts, the profit of genco i, is a quadratic function of quantity.
Hence, the genco can maximize its profit by solving the quadratic function. Define
the optimal solution of Equation (5.4) as x∗i . We have the optimal quantity of
genco i as
x∗i =






, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (5.5)


























Note that Qs is also the SMQ as contract quantity is 0. From Equations (5.5) and
(5.6), we have
x∗i =











, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (5.7)
As a result, the MCP without contracts is
Ps = P (Qs) (5.8)












where Equation (5.9) holds from Equations (5.1) and (5.6), and its variance is











Moreover, the net profit of genco i without contracts is
piin(x
∗
i ) = P (Qs) · x∗i − cix∗i






















where Equation (5.12) holds from Equation (5.8) and Equation (5.13) holds from
















5.2.3 Electricity market with bilateral contracts
We now consider an electricity market with bilateral contracts and n gencos in this
section. The profit of genco i with contracts is
pˆiin(xi) = Pˆ (x− Q¯) · (xi − Q¯i) + P¯ Q¯i − cixi
= −bxi2 +
{



















−(a+ )Q¯i + P¯ Q¯i, (5.15)
where Pˆ (x− Q¯) · (xi− Q¯i) is the revenue from selling electricity in the spot market
and P¯ Q¯i is the revenue from selling electricity through bilateral contracts. More-
over, cixi is the production cost and Equation (5.15) holds from Equation (5.2).
With contracts, the profit of genco i, is a quadratic function of quantity. Hence,
the genco can maximize its profit by solving the quadratic function. Define the
optimal solution of Equation (5.15) as x∗∗i . We have the optimal quantity of genco
i as
x∗∗i =




k )− x∗∗i ] + bQ¯i
2b
. (5.16)





n(a+ )− (∑nk=1 ck) + bQ¯
(n+ 1)b
. (5.17)
Thus, the SMQ is






= Qs − nQ¯
n+ 1
≥ 0, (5.18)
where the first equation holds from Equation (5.17) and Inequality (5.18) holds
from Qˆs ≥ Q¯. Inequality (5.18) implies that








where the equation holds from Equation (5.6).
Now, we present the optimal quantity satisfied by genco i. Similar to Equation
(5.7), we have
x∗∗i =
a+ − (n+ 1)ci + (
∑n
k=1 ck) + (n+ 1)bQ¯i − bQ¯
(n+ 1)b
. (5.20)
As a result, the MCP with contracts is
Pˆs = Pˆ (Qˆs − Q¯) (5.21)
= a− b ·
(










where Equation (5.22) holds from Equations (5.2) and (5.17). As a result, its
variance is











Moreover, the maximal net profit of genco i with contracts is
pˆiin(x
∗∗




· (x∗∗i − Q¯i) + P¯ Q¯i − cix∗∗i











a+ − (n+ 1)ci + (
∑n




+(P¯ − ci)Q¯i (5.26)
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where Equation (5.25) holds from Equation (5.21) and Equation (5.26) holds from



























(ii) Pˆs = Ps − bQ¯
(n+ 1)
.
Proof. (i) From Equations (5.6) and (5.17),
Qˆs =

























= Ps − bQ¯
(n+ 1)
.
From Lemma 5.1, we know that with contracts, MCQ is increased by Q¯/(n+1)
and MCP is decreased by bQ¯/(n + 1). The impact of bilateral contracts on the
MCQ and MCP depends on the number of gencos. We leave the discussion about
the impact of the number of gencos on the MCQ and MCP to Theorem 5.3.
We now present some properties about MCQ, SMQ and MCP. Firstly, we show
that MCQ is an increasing function of contract quantity. Secondly, we show that
MCP and SMQ are decreasing functions of contract quantity. Thirdly, we show
that MCQ with contracts is the upper bound of MCQ without contracts and MCQ
without contracts is the upper bound of SMQ. Fourthly, we show that MCP without
contracts is greater than MCP with contracts. Finally, we show that the variances
of MCP with and without bilateral contracts are identical.
Theorem 5.1.
(i) Qˆs(Q¯) is an increasing function of Q¯.
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(ii) Pˆs(Q¯) and Qˆs(Q¯)− Q¯ are decreasing functions of Q¯.
(iii) Qˆs − Q¯ < Qs < Qˆs.
(iv) Ps > Pˆs.
(v) V ar(Ps) = V ar(Pˆs).
Proof. We have (i), (ii) and (iii) holding directly from Lemma 5.1.

















Theorem 5.1 shows that the variance of MCP is unchanged with the introduction
of bilateral contracts. Next, we show that the variance of CP will be reduced with
bilateral contracts.
Theorem 5.2.




V ar(Pˆ cs ) = V ar
(
ωP¯ + (1− ω)Pˆs
)
= V ar(Pˆs)(1− ω)2 (5.29)
< V ar(Pˆs) (5.30)
= V ar(Ps) (5.31)
= V ar(P cs ), (5.32)
where Equation (5.29) holds because ω and P¯ are constants. Inequality (5.30) holds
from ω ∈ (0, 1]. Moreover, Equation (5.31) holds from Theorem 5.1 and Equation
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(5.32) holds because of no contract on the market.
From Theorem 5.2, we find that the variance of CP is reduced with the intro-
duction of bilateral contracts.
We now consider the situation that the number of gencos goes to infinity. We

















n(a+ )−∑nk=1 ck ≥ 0. (5.33)
Since Qs ≥ 0, we have n(a+)−
∑n
k=1 ck ≥ 0 from Equation (5.6). Thus, Equation
(5.33) holds.
From Assumption 5-2, we have 0 ≤ ci ≤ ci+1, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. Hence,∑n











where the first inequality holds from
∑n
k=1 ck ≤ ncn and the second inequality from
a+ − cn ≥ b.




n(a+ )−∑nk=1 ck = 0.










where the inequality holds from b > 0, Q¯ > 0 and a +  > 0 and ci > 0, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
From Assumption 5-2, we have 0 ≤ ci ≤ ci+1, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. Hence,∑n












where the inequality holds from
∑n
k=1 ck ≥ nc1.
















where K is a constant value in [0, 1].

























where K is a constant value in [0, 1].
When the number of gencos goes to infinity, we show that the MCQ and MCP
are unchanged with and without contracts. Moreover, we have the SMQ is a fixed



































































































where K is a constant value in [0, 1].
From Theorem 5.3, we find that the impact of bilateral contracts on MCQ and
MCP reduces as the number of gencos increases. When the number of gencos
goes to infinity, the impact is minimized. Moreover, we find the closed form ratio
for SMQ divided by MCQ without contracts. When contract quantity is very
small, SMQ tends to equal to MCQ without contracts. By increasing the contract
quantity, the difference between SMQ and MCQ without contracts increases.
Given the total contract quantity, we show that MCQ with contracts, SMQ and
MCP are independent from the allocation of the total contract quantity among
gencos.
Theorem 5.4. Consider a fixed Q¯. We have Qˆs, Qˆs−Q¯ and Pˆs with no relationship
with Q¯i, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Proof. From Equations (5.17), (5.18) and (5.23), the allocation of the fixed con-
tract quantity, Q¯, among gencos has no relationship with MCQ with contracts,
SMQ and MCP.
5.2.4 Market total profit and monopoly ratio
In this section, we show the impact of bilateral contracts on the market total profit.
We first discuss the case that gencos have non-identical marginal costs. Then, we
discuss the case that gencos have identical marginal cost.
Gencos with non-identical marginal costs
Recall in Assumption 5-2, we have 0 ≤ ci ≤ ci+1, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. We now
study the total profit of the market. We first show a closed form of total profit
with and without contracts in Theorem 5.5. Then, we observe that low contract

































































































































where Equation (5.37) holds from Q¯ > 0.
Gencos with identical marginal cost
In this section, we discuss a special case where all the gencos have the same MC,
that is c1 = c2 = · · · = cn = c. We now consider monopoly ratio defined as the total










∗∗) is the profit where only one
genco monopolizes the electricity market. Hence, we have
pˆi11(x
∗∗) =
(a+ − c− bQ¯)2
4b
+ (P¯ − c)Q¯, (5.38)
where Equation (5.38) holds from Equation (5.27).
Let A = a+ − c− bQ¯. From Equation (5.19), we have Q¯ ≤ a+ − nc/b. As









n(a+ − c− bQ¯)2/(n+ 1)2b+ (P¯ − c) Q¯





2 + (n+ 1)2b(P¯ − c)Q¯
A2 + 4b(P¯ − c)Q¯ , (5.39)
where the first equation holds from Equations (5.28) and (5.38).
We now show that the monopoly ratio is a decreasing function of the number
of gencos.
Theorem 5.7. For all gencos with the same marginal cost, the monopoly ratio is
a decreasing function of n.






∗∗) with respect to











A2+4b(P¯−c)Q¯] (n+1)3 ≤ 0,
where the inequality holds from net profit of genco i greater than 0. Hence, we
have the monopoly ratio as a decreasing function of n.
From Theorem 5.7, we find that more gencos reduce the monopoly ratio. This
observation is reasonable since more gencos usually lead to a more competitive
market.




Theorem 5.8. For all gencos with the same marginal cost, the monopoly ratio is
an increasing function of P¯ .






∗∗) with respect to















P¯ − c) Q¯]2
·{(n+ 1)2bQ¯[A2 + 4b (P¯ − c) Q¯]








P¯ − c) Q¯]2
≥ 0,
where the inequality holds from net profit of genco i greater than 0. Hence, we
have the monopoly ratio as an increasing function of contract price, P¯ .
From Theorem 5.8, we find that higher contract price increases the total profit
of all gencos. On the other hand, customers suffer from the high contract price.
Hence, the contract price should be set carefully.
We now show that the monopoly ratio is an increasing function of contract
quantity if all gencos have the same MC and MC is less than the contract price.
Otherwise, the monopoly ratio is a decreasing function of contract quantity.
Theorem 5.9. If all gencos have the same marginal cost, c, and P¯ > c, the
monopoly ratio is an increasing function of Q¯. Otherwise, the monopoly ratio is a
decreasing function of Q¯.






∗∗) with respect to
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A2 + 4b(P¯ − c)Q¯]2
·{[−2nA+ (n+ 1)2(P¯ − c)][A2 + 4b (P¯ − c) Q¯]





2b(P¯ − c)[A2 + 2bQ¯A][
A2 + 4b
(
P¯ − c) Q¯]2 .
Since Q¯ ∈ [0, (a+ − c)/b], we have ∑ni=1 pˆiin(x∗∗)/pˆi11(x∗∗) is an increasing function
of contract quantity for P¯ > c. When P¯ ≤ c, we have the monopoly ratio is a
decreasing function of contract quantity.
5.2.5 Market power
In this section, we investigate the market power, which is defined as the ability
of a genco to maximize its own profit by using bidding strategies (Wolak, 2000).
Generally, the market power is measured by a popular market power index, called
the Lerner Index.
Lerner Index
The Lerner Index is defined as (Chang, 2007)
Lerner Index =
market clearing price−marginal cost
market clearing price
.
The smaller the Lerner Index, the less the market power. Moreover, the Lerner
Index is an increasing function of MCP. Without contracts, the Lerner Index for
genco i is
Li = Ps − ci
Ps
.
Thus, when there are bilateral contracts on the market, the Lerner Index can be
rewritten as
Li = Pˆs − ci
Pˆs
. (5.40)




Theorem 5.10. Li is a constant function of P¯ , for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Proof. From Equation (5.23), the MCP with contracts is a constant function of
contract price. From Equation (5.40), the Lerner Index has no relationship with
the contract price.
Theorem 5.11. Li is a decreasing function of Q¯, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Proof. From Equation (5.23), the MCP is a decreasing function of contract quan-
tity. Since the Lerner Index is an increasing function of MCP, we have the Lerner
Index as a decreasing function of contract quantity from Equation (5.40).
Theorems 5.10 and 5.11 show the impact of contract price and contract quantity
on the Lerner Index. That is, the Lerner Index is a constant function of contract
price. Moreover, the Lerner Index is a decreasing function of contract quantity.
Profit Index
We propose a new index called the Profit Index, to evaluate the market power.
The Profit Index is defined as the ratio of profit with and without competition. In
this section, we first discuss the case that gencos have non-identical marginal costs.
Then, we discuss the case that gencos have identical marginal cost.
Gencos with non-identical marginal costs Define the Profit Index of genco








∗) is the profit of genco i without contracts in the n-genco market and
pii1(x
∗) is the profit of genco i without contracts in the single genco market. From
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(n+ 1)2(a+ − ci)2 .









∗∗) is the profit of genco i with contracts in the n-genco market and
pˆii1(x
∗∗) is the profit of genco i with contracts in the single genco market.
We now investigate the impact of contract price on the Profit Index. The profit




(a+ − ci − bQ¯i)2
4b
+ (P¯ − ci)Q¯i, (5.42)
where Equation (5.42) holds from Equation (5.27). Thus, the Profit Index of genco












/[(n+ 1)2b] + (P¯ − ci)Q¯i
(a+ − ci − bQ¯i)2/(4b) + (P¯ − ci)Q¯i . (5.43)




Lemma 5.4. For x∗∗i ≥ Q¯i,
pˆii1(x
∗∗) ≥ pˆiin(x∗∗).
Proof. Let B = a+ − bQ¯. From Equation (5.20), for x∗∗i ≥ Q¯i, we have
x∗∗j − Q¯j =
a+ − (n+ 1)cj + (
∑n













≥ 0, for j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
From the above inequality, we have














From the above inequality, we can simplify it as
n∑
k 6=i































where Equation (5.45) holds from Equation (5.44).
From Equation (5.19), we have








a+ − (n+ 1)cn +
n∑
k=1
ck − bQ¯ ≥ 0.
Since 0 ≤ ci ≤ ci+1, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, we have





a+ − ci − bQ¯ ≥ 0. (5.46)
From Equation (5.27), we have
pˆii1(x
∗∗)− pˆiin(x∗∗) =
(a+ − ci − bQ¯i)2
4b

































































where Equation (5.47) holds from Q¯i ≤ Q¯ and Equation (5.46). Moreover, Equation
(5.48) holds from Equation (5.45).
Theorem 5.12. For x∗∗i ≥ Q¯i, ηi is an increasing function of P¯ , for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.













where the inequality holds from Lemma 5.4.
From Theorem 5.10, we find that market power measured by the Lerner Index
has no relationship with the contract price. However, market power measured by
the Profit Index has a positive relationship with the contract price. This shows
that the Lerner Index fails to show the impact of contract price. On the other
hand, we find that higher contract price may increase the gencos’ profits when
bilateral contract is applied. As a result, the proposed Profit Index successfully
captures the impact. One possible reason is that contract price has no impact on
the MCP. However, the high contract price results in high profit to gencos from
bilateral contracts.
Gencos with identical marginal cost In this section, we discuss a special
case where all the gencos have the same MC, that is c1 = c2 = ... = cn = c. For













/[(n+ 1)2b] + (P¯ − ci)Q¯i
(a+ − ci − bQ¯i)2/(4b) + (P¯ − ci)Q¯i
=
[
a+ − c− bQ¯]2 /[(n+ 1)2b] + (P¯ − c)Q¯i
(a+ − c− bQ¯i)2/(4b) + (P¯ − c)Q¯i , (5.49)
where the second equation holds from Equation (5.27).
We now show that the Profit Index is a decreasing function of the number of
gencos.
Theorem 5.13. For all gencos with the same marginal cost, the Profit Index is a
decreasing function of n.








a+ − c− bQ¯]2 /[(n+ 1)3b]
(a+ − c− bQ¯i)2/(4b) + (P¯ − c)Q¯i
≤ 0,
where the inequality holds from net profit of genco i greater than 0. Hence, the
Profit Index is a decreasing function of n.
From Theorem 5.13, we find that more gencos reduces the Profit Index. This
observation is reasonable since more gencos usually lead to a more competitive
market.
Gencos with quadratic production cost In the case that gencos with quadratic
production cost, we first examine the relationship between profit of a genco and
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a− Q¯/(1 + bc)
b(n+ 1 + bc)2
)
·[−(n+ bc)(1 + bc)(x∗∗i − Q¯i)− bc(x∗∗i − Q¯i)] (5.53)
= −
(
a− Q¯/(1 + bc)
b(n+ 1 + bc)2
)
[(n+ bc)(1 + bc) + bc](x∗∗i − Q¯i), (5.54)
where Equation (5.52) holds from Equations (4.17) and (4.21), and Equation (5.53)
holds from Equation (4.17). For x∗∗i ≥ Q¯i, we have ∂pˆii(x∗∗i )/∂n < 0 from (5.54).
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Hence, Lemma 5.4 still holds.











where the inequality holds from Lemma 5.4. Hence, Theorem 5.12 still holds in
the case that genecos with quadratic production cost.



















where the inequality holds from Lemma 5.4. Hence, Theorem 5.13 still holds in
the case that genecos with quadratic production cost.
5.3 Numerical study
In this section, we verified our new proposed Profit Index and the relative two
theorems: Theorems 5.12 and 5.13. Due to the length of the thesis, we will not
implement the numerical study for Lerner Index. More information about Lerner
Index can be seen in Chang (2007).
In Singapore electricity market, demand quantity is forecasted as a constant
value which is independent of price. It can be interpreted as a special case of a
linear demand function. Besides, the assumption of quadratic production cost is
verified in Chapter 4. We now use the data of Singapore electricity market from
2004 to 2010 to verify Theorems 5.12 and 5.13 under the environment of linear
demand function and quadratic production cost.
We use the same data of hedge price, hedge ratio, USEP and demand quantity
as Chapters 3 and 4. We also use the data of annual market shares for different
gencos from 2004 to 2010 which are available in the website of Energy Market
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Company. Based on the annual market shares, the numbers of gencos from 2004
to 2010 can be estimated (see Table 5.3). Besides, the data of crude oil prices are
collected from the website of U.S. Energy Information Administration.
Table 5.3: Estimated number of gencos and annual market shares by gencos
Year Estimated Gencos
number of gencos
Senoko Power PowerSeraya Tuas Power SembCorp Keppel Others
2004 4 33% 28% 23% 13% 0% 3%
2005 4 32% 29% 24% 12% 0% 3%
2006 4 32% 28% 26% 11% 0% 2%
2007 5 30% 28% 25% 9% 6% 2%
2008 5 28% 25% 24% 11% 10% 2%
2009 5 26% 27% 24% 11% 9% 3%
2010 5 26% 28% 25% 10% 8% 3%
We analyze the data collected from 2004 to 2010 and there are 28 quarters. Dif-
ferent hedge prices and hedge quantities are assigned by the Singapore government.
In each quarter, the Singapore government decides one hedge price and equally par-
titions the periods into three types: “Peak”, “Shoulder” and “OffPeak”, where the
“Peak” periods are assigned with the highest hedge quantity and the “OffPeak”
periods are assigned with the lowest hedge quantity (Energy Market Authority
(EMA) Singapore, 2010b). Thus, the period numbers of the three types are nearly
equal. All periods in the same type are assigned with the identical hedge price and
quantity. As a result, we consider the data from the same period type in a quarter
as an independent hedge condition and generate one Profit Index for the hedge
condition.
In our numerical study, we assume that all gencos have the same production
cost. There are three reasons for this assumption. One reason is that 97% of the
generating units in Singapore rely on fuel oil and natural gas to generate electricity
(Singapore Market Surveillance and Compliance Panel (MSCP) Singapore 2007).
Therefore, their fuel costs are similar. The second reason is that most of gencos in
Singapore use the same technology, combined-cycle gas turbine technology. More-
over, most of the generating units which use this technology are built during the
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early 2000s (see the website of Energy Market Authority and the website of E2
Singapore). Hence, they have similar energy efficiency. The third reason is that
gencos are equally profitable in the long run. Although the production cost of
each genco is confidential and not available to the public. We believe that their
production costs are similar and highly related. Under this assumption, the market
powers of different gencos are similar.
In our numerical study, we estimate the average production cost as 75% of the
mean CP for each hedge condition. There are three reasons for this estimation.
The first reason is that the average production costs and the CPs are highly related.
Because 97% of the generating units rely on fuel oil and natural gas to generate
electricity as mentioned above. The second reason is that the average production
cost is usually less than the CP in a regular market. Otherwise, the gencos are
losing money which is unreasonable in the long run. The third reason is that for
90% of the total periods, MCPs are no less than 75% of the mean CP. We also
raise the estimated average production cost to 80% of the mean CP. However,
for only 81% of the total periods, MCPs are no less than 80% of the mean CP.
This percentage dramatically decreases as the estimated average production cost
increases. Therefore, we use 75% of the mean CP as the estimation of average
production cost.
To consider regular and profitable markets, we do not select the periods in
which the MCPs are less than the average production cost. As that, we estimate the
average production cost as 75% of the mean CP, 90% of the periods are considered.
However, the selected data for Quarter 4 of 2008 and Quarter 1 of 2009 are much
less (see the eighth column of Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7). The reason may be that
the crude oil prices drastically decrease in these two quarters (see the third column
of Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7). From the sixth column of Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7,
we observe high hedge prices in those two quarters. Thus, the major profits are
contributed by the bilateral contracts and gencos can sacrifice profit from the spot
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market for these two quarters. That is, gencos can accept MCPs less than average
production cost. As a result, fewer periods are considered for these two quarters
in this numerical study.
In order to calculate the Profit Index, we need to estimate profit for one-genco
market. To do so, we first estimate USEP for one-genco market. Thus, we general-
ize the relationship between USEP and demand in Section 4.3.1. We estimate the
USEP for one-genco market by the regression on the nonlinear terms of demand,
oil prices and number of gencos. The Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE)
of this estimation is 3% only. The annual mean of demand, oil price and demand
as well as the estimated number of gencos and USEP for one-genco market from
2004 to 2010 are presented in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Estimated USEP for one-genco market
Year Estimated Mean of Mean of Mean of Mean of estimated
number of gencos Demand Oil Price USEP USEP for one-genco market
2004 4 4042 34 82 206
2005 4 4218 48 110 275
2006 4 4358 58 132 331
2007 5 4547 66 125 374
2008 5 4588 93 162 487
2009 5 4604 72 148 443
2010 5 5009 72 171 512
In this section, we first investigate the relationship between hedge price ratio
and Profit Index. Then, we study the relationship between the number of gencos
and Profit Index.
5.3.1 Relationship between hedge price ratio and Profit In-
dex
Based on the data of USEP, demand, hedge ratio, estimated average production
cost, number of gencos and USEP for one-genco makert, we can calculate the Profit
Index for each period by using Equation (5.41). The quarterly mean of Profit Index
for “Peak”, “Shoulder” and “OffPeak” periods are presented in the tenth column
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of Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7. Since the average costs for different hedge conditions
are different, we use hedge price ratio defined as hedge price divided by average
production cost to represent the unified hedge price (see the seventh and ninth
columns of Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7).
The correlation coefficients between hedge price ratio and Profit Index for each
year are summarized in Table 5.8. We observe that the correlation coefficient for
2007 is not reasonable. The reason may be that the average hedge ratio is reduced
from 65% to 55% during 2007. From the fifth column of Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7,
we observe that the hedge ratios for Quarter 1 and Quarter 2 of 2007 are higher
than the hedge ratios for Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 of 2007.
Among the 21 scenarios, we observe that 19 scenarios have positive correlation
coefficients (see Table 5.8). Moreover, the correlation coefficients for 18 scenarios
are close to 1.00 (see Table 5.8). Hence, Profit Index has highly positive correlation
with hedge price. That is, Profit Index is an increasing function of hedge price.
This result supports Theorem 5.12.
5.3.2 Relationship between number of gencos and Profit
Index
The number of gencos and annual mean of Profit Index are presented in Table
5.9. The correlation coefficients between number of gencos and Profit Index are
summarized in Table 5.10. We observe that the correlation coefficients for “Peak”,
“Shoulder” and “OffPeak” periods all have negative signs (see Table 5.10). More-
over, the correlation coefficients are close to -1.00. Hence, Profit Index has highly
negative correlation with the number of gencos. That is, Profit Index is a decreasing
function of the number of gencos. This result supports Theorem 5.13.
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Table 5.5: Mean of Profit Index for selected Peak periods
Year Quarter Crude oil Mean of Hedge Hedge Average Selected Hedge Mean of
prices customer ratio price cost data price Profit
($/Barrel) price (S$/MWh)(S$/MWh) ratio Index
2004 Q1 29.13 88.12 0.72 94.24 66.09 95.9 % 1.43 0.41
Q2 32.67 93.13 0.72 96.25 69.85 100.0 % 1.38 0.39
Q3 36.45 93.16 0.72 95.73 69.87 100.0 % 1.37 0.39
Q4 38.45 101.42 0.72 101.56 76.07 99.3 % 1.34 0.37
2005 Q1 40.29 97.02 0.75 101.29 72.76 98.7 % 1.39 0.43
Q2 45.21 99.96 0.75 96.35 74.97 100.0 % 1.29 0.37
Q3 55.19 121.78 0.75 117.38 91.33 93.9 % 1.29 0.37
Q4 50.91 129.51 0.75 128.39 97.14 100.0 % 1.32 0.39
2006 Q1 54.52 133.67 0.75 140.70 100.25 94.3 % 1.40 0.44
Q2 62.90 142.13 0.75 139.44 106.59 100.0 % 1.31 0.38
Q3 63.51 147.15 0.75 147.90 110.36 98.4 % 1.34 0.40
Q4 52.71 145.89 0.75 150.20 109.42 92.8 % 1.37 0.42
2007 Q1 51.86 132.63 0.75 134.66 99.47 87.8 % 1.35 0.34
Q2 61.51 121.91 0.75 121.14 91.43 100.0 % 1.32 0.33
Q3 69.60 135.25 0.63 137.25 101.44 100.0 % 1.35 0.26
Q4 82.20 145.71 0.63 150.04 109.28 100.0 % 1.37 0.26
2008 Q1 90.21 158.42 0.63 161.80 118.82 100.0 % 1.36 0.26
Q2 114.51 182.41 0.63 174.44 136.81 100.0 % 1.28 0.23
Q3 113.33 192.08 0.63 183.25 144.06 100.0 % 1.27 0.24
Q4 54.17 195.80 0.63 238.64 146.85 33.9 % 1.63 0.35
2009 Q1 40.16 139.02 0.63 167.14 104.27 13.5 % 1.60 0.34
Q2 55.84 167.65 0.63 115.26 125.74 100.0 % 0.92 0.15
Q3 72.46 154.84 0.63 138.92 116.13 99.7 % 1.20 0.20
Q4 71.67 171.41 0.63 161.70 128.56 100.0 % 1.26 0.22
2010 Q1 74.76 196.41 0.63 171.05 147.31 98.1 % 1.16 0.19
Q2 74.79 181.40 0.63 176.10 136.05 100.0 % 1.29 0.24
Q3 72.46 171.28 0.63 176.29 128.46 96.8 % 1.37 0.26
Q4 80.52 177.53 0.63 165.71 133.15 98.6 % 1.24 0.22
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Table 5.6: Mean of Profit Index for selected Shoulder periods
Year Quarter Crude oil Mean of Hedge Hedge Average Selected Hedge Mean of
prices customer ratio price cost data price Profit
($/Barrel) price (S$/MWh)(S$/MWh) ratio Index
2004 Q1 29.13 86.12 0.65 94.24 64.59 87.6 % 1.46 0.37
Q2 32.67 94.73 0.65 96.25 71.05 100.0 % 1.35 0.32
Q3 36.45 91.27 0.65 95.73 68.45 99.9 % 1.40 0.34
Q4 38.45 99.60 0.65 101.56 74.70 96.7 % 1.36 0.32
2005 Q1 40.29 98.41 0.65 101.29 73.81 89.0 % 1.37 0.33
Q2 45.21 100.72 0.65 96.35 75.54 100.0 % 1.28 0.30
Q3 55.19 115.29 0.65 117.38 86.47 96.7 % 1.36 0.33
Q4 50.91 128.09 0.65 128.39 96.07 99.9 % 1.34 0.32
2006 Q1 54.52 132.42 0.65 140.70 99.31 88.2 % 1.42 0.35
Q2 62.90 138.13 0.65 139.44 103.59 100.0 % 1.35 0.32
Q3 63.51 157.04 0.65 147.90 117.78 79.8 % 1.26 0.28
Q4 52.71 144.25 0.65 150.20 108.19 74.0 % 1.39 0.34
2007 Q1 51.86 138.83 0.65 134.66 104.12 77.1 % 1.29 0.24
Q2 61.51 118.57 0.65 121.14 88.93 100.0 % 1.36 0.27
Q3 69.60 132.65 0.55 137.25 99.49 100.0 % 1.38 0.22
Q4 82.20 144.55 0.55 150.04 108.41 100.0 % 1.38 0.22
2008 Q1 90.21 159.32 0.55 161.80 119.49 100.0 % 1.35 0.22
Q2 114.51 180.92 0.55 174.44 135.69 100.0 % 1.29 0.20
Q3 113.33 187.32 0.55 183.25 140.49 100.0 % 1.30 0.21
Q4 54.17 183.49 0.55 238.64 137.62 34.3 % 1.73 0.31
2009 Q1 40.16 132.59 0.55 167.14 99.44 12.5 % 1.68 0.30
Q2 55.84 129.80 0.55 115.26 97.35 100.0 % 1.18 0.19
Q3 72.46 146.95 0.55 138.92 110.21 100.0 % 1.26 0.19
Q4 71.67 159.48 0.55 161.70 119.61 100.0 % 1.35 0.21
2010 Q1 74.76 175.16 0.55 171.05 131.37 97.6 % 1.30 0.20
Q2 74.79 174.94 0.55 176.10 131.20 100.0 % 1.34 0.21
Q3 72.46 162.25 0.55 176.29 121.69 96.0 % 1.45 0.24
Q4 80.52 166.64 0.55 165.71 124.98 97.8 % 1.33 0.21
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Table 5.7: Mean of Profit Index for selected OffPeak periods
Year Quarter Crude oil Mean of Hedge Hedge Average Selected Hedge Mean of
prices customer ratio price cost data price Profit
($/Barrel) price (S$/MWh)(S$/MWh) ratio Index
2004 Q1 29.13 81.20 0.56 94.24 60.90 75.9 % 1.55 0.32
Q2 32.67 86.69 0.56 96.25 65.01 100.0 % 1.48 0.31
Q3 36.45 88.26 0.56 95.73 66.19 95.6 % 1.45 0.30
Q4 38.45 93.09 0.56 101.56 69.82 92.2 % 1.45 0.30
2005 Q1 40.29 92.33 0.51 101.29 69.24 85.4 % 1.46 0.28
Q2 45.21 101.82 0.52 96.35 76.37 100.0 % 1.26 0.23
Q3 55.19 110.94 0.52 117.38 83.20 99.7 % 1.41 0.26
Q4 50.91 123.20 0.52 128.39 92.40 100.0 % 1.39 0.26
2006 Q1 54.52 126.43 0.51 140.70 94.82 97.5 % 1.48 0.27
Q2 62.90 136.32 0.52 139.44 102.24 100.0 % 1.36 0.26
Q3 63.51 140.74 0.51 147.90 105.56 95.3 % 1.40 0.26
Q4 52.71 129.36 0.51 150.20 97.02 60.2 % 1.55 0.30
2007 Q1 51.86 119.05 0.51 134.66 89.29 74.4 % 1.51 0.23
Q2 61.51 112.47 0.52 121.14 84.35 100.0 % 1.44 0.22
Q3 69.60 123.24 0.44 137.25 92.43 97.1 % 1.48 0.20
Q4 82.20 138.70 0.43 150.04 104.02 98.3 % 1.44 0.19
2008 Q1 90.21 152.66 0.43 161.80 114.49 97.9 % 1.41 0.18
Q2 114.51 175.53 0.44 174.44 131.65 100.0 % 1.33 0.18
Q3 113.33 185.50 0.43 183.25 139.13 100.0 % 1.32 0.18
Q4 54.17 163.11 0.43 238.64 122.33 34.6 % 1.95 0.28
2009 Q1 40.16 114.89 0.44 167.14 86.17 12.2 % 1.94 0.28
Q2 55.84 133.50 0.44 115.26 100.13 100.0 % 1.15 0.16
Q3 72.46 136.90 0.43 138.92 102.68 99.5 % 1.35 0.18
Q4 71.67 147.93 0.44 161.70 110.95 100.0 % 1.46 0.19
2010 Q1 74.76 160.10 0.44 171.05 120.07 100.0 % 1.42 0.19
Q2 74.79 164.66 0.44 176.10 123.49 100.0 % 1.43 0.19
Q3 72.46 152.58 0.44 176.29 114.43 99.8 % 1.54 0.20
Q4 80.52 153.59 0.44 165.71 115.19 98.5 % 1.44 0.19
Table 5.8: Correlation coefficient of hedge price ratio and mean of Profit Index for
selected periods
Year Correlation coefficient of hedge price ratio and mean of Profit Index
Peak Shoulder OffPeak
2004 0.9998 0.9954 0.9897
2005 0.9993 0.9965 0.9969
2006 0.9998 0.9982 0.9692
2007 -0.5711 -0.2778 0.3380
2008 0.9985 0.9978 0.9971
2009 0.9878 0.9906 0.9918
2010 0.9964 0.9953 0.9943
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Table 5.9: Estimated number of gencos and annual mean of Profit Index for selected
periods
Year Estimated number of Annual mean of Profit Index
gencos
Peak Shoulder OffPeak
2004 4 0.39 0.34 0.31
2005 4 0.39 0.32 0.26
2006 4 0.41 0.32 0.27
2007 5 0.29 0.24 0.21
2008 5 0.25 0.22 0.19
2009 5 0.20 0.20 0.18
2010 5 0.23 0.22 0.19
Table 5.10: Correlation coefficient of number of gencos and mean of Profit Index
for selected periods
Peak Shoulder OffPeak
Correlation coefficient of number
of gencos and mean of Profit Index -0.94 -0.98 -0.93
5.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we use Cournot models to investigate the impact of bilateral con-
tracts on the spot market. MCQ, SMQ, MCP, CP, total profit of the market and
market power in the spot market are examined. The assumption that demand
function is unchanged with the introduction of bilateral contracts is justified in our
models.
There are three major results from our study. Firstly, we find several properties
for the MCQ, SMQ, MCP and CP. When the bilateral contracts are introduced,
MCQ may be increased and MCP may be decreased. We show that the MCQ
is an increasing function of contract quantity. Also, the MCP and the SMQ are
decreasing functions of contract quantity. We also show that MCQ with contracts
is an upper bound of MCQ without contracts, and MCQ without contracts is
an upper bound of SMQ. Moreover, we show that the MCP is reduced in the
spot market with contracts. The variances of MCP with and without bilateral
contracts are identical. However, the variance of CP is reduced with contracts. In
the situation that the number of gencos goes to infinity, the MCQ and MCP are
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unchanged with and without contracts. Moreover, SMQ is a fixed portion of MCQ
without contracts. In addition, we have that the allocation of fixed total contract
quantity may not affect the MCQ, SMQ and MCP.
Secondly, we find several properties for total profit of the market. We derive
the closed forms for total profit of the markets with and without contracts. We also
show that the total profit of the market is reduced by the introduction of bilateral
contracts if contract price is less than MC.
Thirdly, the impact of bilateral contracts on the market power is investigated.
We use a conventional index, Lerner Index, to test the market power. Then, we
propose a new index, called the Profit Index, to test the market power. The Lerner
Index shows that market power is reduced by the introduction of bilateral contracts.
By using the Profit Index, market power is an increasing function of contract price
for a given contract quantity. Moreover, market power is a decreasing function of
number of gencos. A numerical study is conducted using data of the Singapore
electricity market from 2004 to 2010 to verify these two results.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Research
The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate the effects of bilateral contracts.
We are interested in the effects of bilateral contracts on controlling the price volatil-
ity and market power. In this chapter, we conclude the study by presenting and
discussing the research results of Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Furthermore, possible direc-
tions for future research are presented.
6.1 Conclusions
In Chapter 3, we build mathematical models and analyze how the hedge price and
quantity affect the uncertainties of MCP and CP. Variances are used to character-
ize the uncertainties of MCP and CP. We consider an unstable environment and
assume that electricity supply is a discrete function. We assume that gencos make
offers according to their production costs, generating unit availability and other
related factors without strategic behavior. The production cost is uncertain due to
uncertain fuel prices and possible breakdown of generating units. We also assume
that demand is inelastic in our model. In a single period, gencos may consider a
simple and fair strategy: having zero expectation on extra profit/cost caused by
hedging price and quantity. In our model, we assume that gencos estimate the
demand over and above the hedge quantity to be L and adjust their offer prices to
balance the gain or loss with L for zero expectation. There are four major analyt-
ical results from our models. Firstly, we find that the variance of MCP increases
when hedge quantity is assigned. Also, the variance of CP decreases when hedge
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quantity is assigned. Secondly, we find that the variances of MCP and CP do not
have statistically significant relationships with the hedge price. Thirdly, we find
that the variances of MCP and CP are decreasing functions of neutralizing quantity
L. Fourthly, we find that the variance of MCP is an increasing function of hedge
quantity. A numerical study is conducted using data from the Singapore electricity
market from 2003 to 2010 to verify our model assumptions and the main results.
The data are also used to conduct parameter estimation.
In Chapter 3, we develop the model and assume that the genco bids according
to its marginal cost and does not consider bilateral contracts. To incorporate the
competition behaviors of gencos, the SFE and Cournot models are adopted. In
Chapter 4, we formulate the spot market by using SFE and Cournot models and
examine the impact of bilateral contracts on the variances of MCP and CP. We
assume that the production cost is quadratic and marginal cost is linear in both
models. We also assume that demand function is linear with uncertainty. Under
these assumptions, the variances of MCP and CP are decreasing functions of con-
tract quantity in a competitive market. Even when the market is not competitive,
bilateral contract can also reduce the variances of MCP and CP by setting con-
tract quantity within a reasonable range. These two results hold in both SFE and
Cournot models. Real data from the Singapore electricity market from 2003 to
2010 are used to verify our findings. The results of the numerical study support
our models.
The price volatility is studied in Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 5, we study
Cournot models to investigate the impact of bilateral contracts on the spot mar-
ket. The MCQ, SMQ, MCP, CP, profit of the market and market power in the
spot market are examined closely. We assume that the production cost is lin-
ear in Cournot models. We also assume the demand function to be linear with
uncertainty. There are three features in this chapter.
Firstly, we assume that demand function is changed with the introduction of
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bilateral contracts in our models. The analytical results show that our models are
identical to those models with unchanged demand functions. This finding provides
good justification for the assumption that the demand function is unchanged with
the introduction of bilateral contracts.
Secondly, we find some properties for the MCQ, SMQ, MCP, CP and profit of
the market. When the bilateral contracts are introduced, MCQ may be increased
and MCP may be decreased. We show that the MCQ is an increasing function
of contract quantity. Also, the MCP and the SMQ are decreasing functions of
contract quantity. We also show that MCQ with contracts is an upper bound of
MCQ without contracts, while MCQ without contracts is an upper bound of SMQ.
Moreover, we show that the MCP is reduced in the spot market with contracts.
We also show that the variances of MCP are identical with and without bilateral
contracts. However, the variance of CP is reduced with contracts. In addition, we
find that the allocation of total contract quantity may not affect the MCQ, SMQ
and MCP; that is, the allocation of fixed total contract quantity has no relationship
with the MCQ, SMQ and MCP. Besides, we find several properties for the profit
of the market. We derive the closed forms for total profit of the market with and
without contracts. We also show that the total profit of the market is reduced by
the introduction of bilateral contracts if contract price is less than MC.
Thirdly, the impact of bilateral contracts on the market power is investigated.
We first use a conventional index, Lerner Index, to test the market power. This
Lerner Index shows that market power is reduced by the introduction of bilateral
contracts. We then propose another index which is defined as the ratio of profits
with and without competition. We call this index the Profit Index. By using this
Profit Index, we find that market power is an increasing function of contract price
subject to a given contract quantity. Several numerical studies are conducted using
data of the Singapore electricity market to verify our analytical results.
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There are several possible extensions of this thesis. One extension is to consider dif-
ferent risk measurement tools, such as Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Conditional Value-
at-Risk (CVaR). Another extension is to relax existing assumptions. Considering
multi-period models is also a possible extension. With multi-period models, we can
use game theory to study the interaction of market participants.
6.2.1 Different measurements on price volatility
In this thesis, we use variance to measure the uncertainty. We would like to con-
sider other uncertainty measures on the market price. From the viewpoint of the
government, we care not only about the uncertainty of market price but also the
risks faced directly by market participants. VaR is a methodology developed by
the financial industry. It measures the expected maximum loss over a certain time
horizon within a given confidence interval. CVaR is defined as the conditional
expectation of losses given that the loss exceeds a threshold value (Alexander et
al., 2006). Thus, VaR and CVaR may be better for measuring the risks of market
participants. VaR and CVaR can be used to measure the uncertainties and risks
of MCP and CP in future studies.
6.2.2 Relaxation of assumptions
In Chapter 3, we assume that the revenue or cost arising from hedging will be
neutralized by selling the next L quantity. However, in the real world, this revenue
or cost may or may not be neutralized. Alternatively, it will be neutralized in
other ways. Thus, we are interested in different neutralizing methods as well.
For example, gencos may neutralize their loss without neutralizing their gain from
contracts.
In Chapter 4, we assume that the gencos are symmetric and the supply functions
they submit are linear. These two assumptions may not reflect the situations in
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the real world. For example, the gencos submit offers (price-quantity pairs) instead
of linear supply functions in the real world. Hence, we would like to relax those
assumptions in the future work.
In Chapter 5, we assume production cost to be linear. In the future, we may con-
sider quadratic production cost functions which are widely used in related studies
(Niu et al., 2005; Bushnell, 2007). Instead of using the Cournot model, we may also
consider SFE models (Klemperer and Meryer, 1989). These models reflect more
characteristics of the real electricity market than Cournot models. For example,
the gencos submit offers (price-quantity pairs) in the real market. We can formu-
late these offers as step functions. In SFE models, all gencos maximize their profits
by choosing optimal supply functions, unlike Cournot models in which gencos only
compete on quantity. As a result, SFE models can capture the characteristics of
the offers better than Cournot models.
6.2.3 Multi-period problem
In this thesis, we only consider single-period in our models. However, the decisions
made by gencos are usually for multi-period situations. Moreover, gencos may
not be able to neutralize their profits within one period. They may neutralize
their profits in multiple periods. In addition, gencos competing in a market may
deliberately lose money during certain periods in order to monopolize the market.
Then, they can neutralize the lose in the future. Thus, multi-period models provide
an interesting future research direction.
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